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Trends in the Structure
of Capital Formation
iN the preceding chapter we dealt with capital formation as a total.
Much can be learned also by studying its various components and dis-
tinguishing the domestic sector, that is, additions to capital located
within the United States, from changes in claims against foreign coun-
tries; and by distinguishing not only the types of domestic capital
formation—construction, producers' equipment, and inventories—but
also the broad groups of eventual users—households, business firms,
and governments, and even the business firms by their industrial
affiliation. The present chapter is devoted to a summary of trends in
the structure of capital formation, and to a discussion of factors that
may have accounted for these trends.
Net Changes in Claims against Foreign Countries
Additions to the stock of buildings, plants, machinery, and inven-
tories within the country may represent the current product of the
economic activity of the members of the nation and their capital, or
the product of the activity of members of other nations and their capi-
tal. The totals presented and analyzed in the preceding chapter were
those of national capital formation, i.e., including additions to capital
stock whether at home or abroad, so long as they belonged to the
members of the community we call the United States. Such national
capital formation may be smaller or larger than the total additions to
capitallocatedwithinthecountry—domesticcapitalformation:
smaller if, on balance, the additions to claims by foreign countries
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against the United States are larger than the additions to claims by
the United States against foreign countries; and larger if, on balance,
the additions to claims by foreign countries against the United
States are smaller than additions to claims by the United States
against foreign countries. In the former case, the net balance of
foreign claims is negative; and part of domestic capital formation is
financed by foreign capital funds or by the reduction of United States
claims through the loss of gold, which represents a stock of inter-
nationally acceptable claims. In the latter case, the net balance of
foreign claims is positive, and to domestic capital formation we must
add those additions to claims against foreign countries—in the form
of a larger stock of gold or of other types of claims (foreign securities,
direct ownership of real assets abroad, and the like).
We begin with this division of total national capital formation be-
tween the domestically located part and the changes in foreign claims
partly because it bears most directly upon an important point in our
discussion in Chapter 3. We argued there that a major limitation
upon the long-term level of capital formation in the United States
lay in the supply of savings that the economy could generate; and
that, by and large, this limitation may have outweighed any long-term
limits on the side of demand for capital funds, i.e., on the side of
domestic investment opportunities. If so, could these limits on domestic
capital formation be removed by drawing upon savings abroad? To
test this possibility, we examine the extent to which shortages in the
supply of domestic savings were relieved by the inflow of savings from
foreign countries.
There is another reason for beginning with an examination of
changes in claims against foreign countries. In a review of the mech-
anism by which such changes are brought about, much can be glimpsed
of the factors that determine the flow of savings into capital forma-
tion, and these factors are not unlike those that govern the flow of
savings into various types of domestic capital formation. Hence, what-
ever we learn about the forces that have determined the trend in the
relative share of net changes in claims against foreign countries may
contribute to the hypotheses that serve as preliminary leads in the
analysis of trends in the distribution of domestic capital formation
among its various components.
With these comments in mind, we turn to Table 10, which sum-
marizes the flows to and from this country from 1850 to 1955, and the





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
tion of the flows is indispensable to the understanding of the net
changes.
The first group of entries (lines 1—7) records the flows to this coun-
try from abroad—the sources of gross additions to claims by foreign
countries against the United States. The major item here is imports
of merchandise (line1), and to this we add purchases of services
rendered by foreign resources—shipping, expenditures abroad by Amer-
ican tourists, insurance and other financial services, and the like. We
must also add income earned by foreign capital invested in the United
States. A plant located in the United States, but owned by a member
of a foreign nation, must be viewed as part of foreign, not United
States, resources, and the earnings on such an investment constitute an
addition to claims against this country. Finally, a claim against the
United States can arise without any antecedent import of a commodity
from abroad, without any purchase of a service rendered by foreign
resources, and without foreign ownership of resources located within
the United States. A member or some collective body of the United
States community can make a gift to a person or group abroad—and
by its nature there is no tangible or overt quid pro quo. Such gifts,
whether private remittances or government grants, are described as
unilateral transfers, and are entered on a net basis (that is, net of any
gifts from abroad to the United States) in line 6.
There is conceptually no duplication or overlapping among the
five categories of additions to foreign claims against the United States.
Imports of merchandise cannot, in the nature of the case, be included
either under the purchase of services, military expenditures abroad,
or under income on foreign investments. If the value of the import
includes the charges for shipping by a foreign carrier, these charges
are not included under services. If income originates in a plant located
within the United States, it cannot appear under imports. And since
unilateral transfers are direct additions to foreign claims, they cannot
overlap imports from abroad, though they may be exports from the
United States. Not only are the five categories nonduplicating, they are
also comprehensive in that they comprise all current additions to
foreign claims; and their sum is the total of all current additions to
foreign claims against this country.
The second group of entries (lines 8—12) deals with the counterfiows,
the sources of additions to United States claims against foreign coun-
tries. Here the major item is exports of merchandise, supplemented by
the sales of some services of United States resources to persons abroad
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and, in recent years, by military transfers. There is also, of course,
income on United States investments abroad. Since, however, uni-
lateral transfers are taken on a net basis in line 6 (such transfers to the
United States have in any case been negligible), no entry for this item
appears under additions to United States claims against foreign coun-
tries. Corresponding to the total of additions to foreign claims (line 7),
there is the total of additions to claims by the United States against
foreign countries (line 12).
It is the balances on these various accounts that are of particular
interest (lines 13—19). Exports of merchandise can be balanced against
imports of merchandise; exports of services against imports of services;
and so on. However, such matching does not mean that claims against
foreign countries derived from exports are in fact used to finance
imports of merchandise but not to pay income on foreign investments.
There is no reason for assuming that current additions to claims
against foreign countries do not flow into a common pool in which
their identity is lost, and from which drafts are made to finance any
purchase from or payment abroad. Even if the sources retain their
i(lentity, it does not necessarily follow that a particular batch of claims
originates as an export of a commodity rather than, say, as income on
a United States investment abroad. The matching is just a simple
classifying device, intended to show how each type of transaction—in
commodities, in services, in income on investments, and so on—con-
tributes to the net balance of or changes in total claims against foreign
countries. This total (line 19) is of most interest to us, for it is a com-
ponent of total capital formation and represents the difference be-
tween total and domestic capital formation.
This total net change in foreign claims, described in the current
international balance of payments terminology as net foreign invest-
ment, can also, theoretically, be derived from movements in stocks of
claims. In lines 20 to 23 these movements in stocks of claims are sum-
marized, the claims being classified into two major categories—gold and
capital assets. If the data on capital assets were complete and accurate,
net changes in gold and capital assets (line 20 plus line 23) would agree
with the total in line 19; but, since the estimates of capital assets are
deficient, the item of errors and omissions (line 24) is introduced to
provide the identity.
Two aspects of Table 10 should be noted before we comment on
the findings. First, the periods distinguished were determined partly
by the supply of data, partly by the desire to separate periods char-
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acterized by distinctive complexes of economic and other conditions.
Thus, detailed estimates are available for 1850—1873, 1874—1895, 1896—
1914, and 1914—1918, but not for the years or subperiods within each;
and, while we were able to derive single-year estimates of total net
changes in foreign claims for the years before 1919, it would have been
impossible to calculate annual estimates of all the items in Table 10.
We have, therefore, used the series for the periods as given, but extended
the fourth through 1922, partly because the first few years after World
War I were still much affected by it, partly because complete and re-
liable estimates by the Department of Commerce begin with 1923.
Then we distinguish 1923—1928, a period of relative prosperity; 1929—
1940, a period affected by the Great Depression; the years of World
War II, most distinctive from the standpoint of conditions for flow of
goods, services, and claims across the country's boundaries; and, finally,
the post-World War II decade.
The second point to be noted is that the estimates for the periods
before the 1920's are necessarily approximate, and we took advantage
of the recent and detailed work by Goldsmith which contains revisions
for 1897—1914 and 1915—1922. These are summarized in Table 11, which
can be regarded as an appendix to Table 10. It is important to em-
phasize that throughout our study we accepted Goldsmith's figures on
savings, and they are, therefore, the basis for our estimates of net
changes in foreign claims, and hence of national capital formation.
His revisions are minor for the period 1915—1922, and not large
absolutely even for 1897—1914. They show a positive balance for that
period compared with a negative balance in the older estimates, al-
though in both estimates net changes in claims are relatively small.
Among the findings suggested by Tables 10 and 11, there is, as ex-
pected, a substantial rise in the flows to and from this country. Total
imports of goods and services per year rose from less than one-half bil-
lion dollars during 1850—1873 to close to $13 billion in 1946—1955
Table 10, line 5). Total exports of goods and services per year rose
from less than one-third billion dollars during the first period to
almost $19 billion during the post-World War II decade (Table 10,
line 12). Even the net balance rose considerably in volume, signs dis-
regarded—from between $50 million and $100 million per year in the
early periods to over $1 billion per year in the latest (Table 10, line 19);
or to almost $6 billion, excluding unilateral transfers (line 17). All
these volumes are in current prices and affected by price changes, but
even when adjusted for price changes, both gross and net flows would
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TABLE11
REWSIONOF BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS ITEMS, 1897—1922
(annual averages, millions of dollars)
1897—19141915—1922
(1) (2)
Balancesof or Net Changes in Claims
On Account of:
1. Commodities 571 2,810
2. Services —201 —414
3. Income on investments —78 346
4. Total, lines I to 3 291 2,742
5. Private remittances —147 —372
6. Total, lines 4 and 5 144 2,370
Changes in Stocks of Claims
7. Gold stocks (increase —) —68 —265
8. U.S. foreign assets (increase —) —102 —1,888
Totalprivate —102 —622
Direct —76 —64
Other long-term —26 —558
Government — —1,266
9. Foreign assets in U.S. (increase +; decrease —) 82 —240
Long-term 57 —213
Short-term 25 —26
10. Net balance of assets, lines 8 and 9 —20 —2,128
11. Errors and omissions, line 6, signs reversed, minus lines
7andlO —56 23
Because of rounding, detail will not necessarily add to total.
SOURCE: Raymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, Vol. I
(Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 1078—1085.
still show a sharp secular rise. This is hardly surprising in view of
the country's prodigious growth during the century covered by the
estimates. One cannot attach much significance to these movements,
unless they are compared with the movements in other countrywide
totals to reveal whether the proportional weight and contribution of
international flows, gross and net, have changed materially.
Even the absolute figures in Tables 10 and 11 clearly suggest three
important, if familiar, findings. First, during periods of major wars,
there is an acceleration in outflows—in exports of commodities and
services to other participants in the conflict (excluding any flows rep.
resenting direct participation by this country). Such marked rise in
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exports sets up other movements, not only in balances and stocks of
claims, but on the import side as well. Thus during World War I the
huge rise in exports from the United States was offset partly by a rise
in imports, but largely by an outflow of capital funds, some of which
represented repatriation of foreign investments in this country, some,
advances in capital loans by the United States. During World War II,
the large rise in exports was offset partly by a rise in imports, but
largely by unilateral transfers—government grants of various kinds to
our allies.
Second, unilateral transfers have become of major importance in
the whole network of international flows, to an extent unparalleled
in the past. Their increase during the quinquennium of World War II
was mentioned above. It continued through the post-World War II
decade, and is obviously a factor that must be considered in the future.
With this growing importance of unilateral transfers, net changes in
claims against foreign countries can now be negative not because of
greater investment of foreign capital in the United States, but because
of greater grants by the United States to other countries.
Third, the balance of changes in claims against foreign countries
has shifted from negative to positive. It was negative in the first two
periods, covering 1850 to 1895, although even as early as 1874—1895
the net balance of merchandise and services was positive (see Table 10,
lines 13 and 14). The country was exporting more commodities and
services than it was importing, and capital imports were financing in-
terest payments to foreigners, and gifts. According to the older set of
estimates, that situation continued through 1896—1914, but Goldsmith's
revisions for 1897—1914 suggest a small positive balance. Certainly
World War I saw a sharp reversal, and since that time positive bal-
ances have been the rule with the single exception of the World War II
quinquenniurn when huge unilateral transfers were made. With this
exception, by and large since the late 1890's, there has been no period
'f net imports of foreign capital; and only during the first five years
of the total period covered in our study—from 1869 to the mid-1870's—
was capital formation located within the United States assisted by net
inflow of capital funds from abroad.
The picture becomes more distinct when we relate exports, im-
ports, and other sources of foreign claims to countrywide totals. The
first comparison is presented in Table 12, where the various flows
summarized in Tables 10 and 11 are expressed as percentages of gross
national product in current prices.
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Table 12 excludes the period 1850—1873, because we have no reliable
estimates of gross national product for those years. But more impor-
tant is the question whether gross national product is the proper base
of reference. It might be more logical to use gross national product plus
imports of goods, i.e., including imports of commodities, services, and
income on foreign investments in the United States. Theoretically, net
imports can exceed domestically produced output, in which case na-
tional product, gross or net, will be negative; and any reference to a
negative base would be illogical. However, the total of gross national
product and all imports of goods, which could be described as the
total of all available resources, would be, as Table 12 clearly indicates,
not much larger than gross national product, because in no period
have imports constituted as much as 10 per cent of total national out-
put. Percentages of total available resources would therefore differ
only slightly from percentages of gross national product, and the
trends in the two would practically parallel each other. 'We decided,
therefore, to let the comparison stand, since gross national product is
the base of reference for all other comparisons.
With this qualification, the major trends can be briefly summarized.
First, the proportion of imports of all goods, including income on
foreign investments, was at its highest during 1874—1895: almost 8 per
cent of gross national product. It declined thereafter, and in the last
period, the post-World War II decade, it was only 4.9 per cent of gross
national product. This percentage is somewhat higher than that in
the depressed period 1929—1940 but distinctly below the level of 5.9
per cent in 1923—1928.
Second, the share of unilateral transfers tended to increase, but it
was minor—below 1 per cent of gross national product—until the World
War II quinquennium, when it rose markedly. But even in the post-
World War II decade, when it was somewhat less than 2 per cent of
gross national product, it was distinctly higher than during any other
period except that of World War II, keeping the proportional level
of total additions to foreign claims higher than at any period since
World War I. Despite this bolstering effect of unilateral transfers, the
share of all additions to foreign claims in gross national product in
1946—1955 was lower than before the 1920's.
Third, the share of all exports in gross national product, disregard-
ing the two world war periods, drifted downward—from 7.5 per cent
in 1874—1895 to 7.2 per cent in 1946—1955. But this decline in the pro.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
proportional weight of inflows, and it might be safer to infer that no
significant decline in the relative share of outflows has occurred. The
absence of a significant decline is associated with the rise in the pro-
portional weight of unilateral transfers, which induces a greater flow of
exports. However, it is not quite legitimate to argue that without the
unilateral transfers exports from the United States would have de-
clined. Had the large government grants not been made in 1946—1955,
foreign countries might still have been able to purchase some of the
United States exports that were in fact financed by those grants. But
if we do assume a direct connection between the two, total exports of
commodities and services in 1946—1955 would have amounted to 4.3
per cent of gross national product (line 15), and the addition of income
on investments abroad would have meant an outflow of goods equiva-
lent to 5.4 per cent of gross national product, compared with per-
centages of about 7percent in 1874—1895, 1896—1914, 1923—1928, and
5.3 per cent in the depressed period 1929—1940. In other words, the
proportion of total exports to gross national product may have failed
to decline largely because of the increase in the relative weight of uni-
lateral transfers, particularly during the post-World War II decade.
Fourth, the total net balance was a minute fraction of gross national
product—below 1 per cent—except during the period dominated by
World War I; but small as the balance was, we find a clear reversal
from negative balances, indicating foreign capital imports, in the
earlier periods, to positive balances, indicating United States capital
exports, in the later periods. These positive balances, prevailing since
the end of the nineteenth century, are particularly evident when we
adjust for the effects of unilateral transfers (line 16). But even with this
adjustment, they range from less than 1 to slightly over 2 per cent of
gross national product, except during the world war periods.
However, our major interest here is the relation of net changes in
foreign claims not to national product but to capital formation; for
we are concerned with the level of and trend in this component as
part of total capital formation. The relevant percentages are given in
Table 13. In part A the percentages are for the periods distinguished in
Tables 10 through 12; in part B they are for overlapping decades from
1869 to 1955.
Two conclusions stand out. First, except for the years associated with
World War I, net changes in claims against foreign countries con-
stituted large percentages of net capital formation alone, and only for
periods in which depressed economic conditions lowered the absolute
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level of net capital formation appreciably. If we were to group the
years, as we should for secular analysis, to avoid the marked effects of
depressions or major wars, we would find that net changes in claims
against foreign countries never averaged more than 10 per cent of net
capital formation, and distinctly less than that as a per cent of gross
capital formation. In other words, quantitatively, net foreign addi-
tions to or drafts upon domestic capital formation, particularly gross,
have not been a secularly important component of capital formation in
this country.
Second, we naturally find here the reversal in sign noted above. In
the earlier periods, domestic capital formation was larger than the
total, the former being financed in part by a net inflow of capital from
abroad. In the later periods, the opposite was true: domestic capital
formation was smaller than the total, the latter being accounted for in
part by net additions to capital investments abroad by the United
States.
This necessarily summary account of the long-term trends in the
balance of international payments of this country, and in the im-
portance of outflows,inflows, and their net balance relativeto
national product and capital formation, raises three questions. (1)
Why, during the second half of the nineteenth century, when this
country enjoyed extraordinary growth, were not the inflows of foreign
capital proportionately more substantial? (2) Why have the net changes
in foreign claims shifted from negative to positive, from net capital im-
ports to net capital exports, although the rapid growth that continued
through the twentieth century could presumably have absorbed net
capital imports from abroad? (3) Given the factors that make for net
capital exports, which would presumably provide at least part of the
answer to question (2), what limits the proportional level of capital
exports? Clearly, these questions involve consideration of conditions
not only in this country but in the rest of the world, and data and
knowledge at our command are hardly sufficient for well founded and
tested answers. Yet some attempt to deal with them must be made,
if only to penetrate below the surface of the overt flows that have
been summarized statistically, and to suggest the lines of direction
that might lead to a tentative explanation.
1. The first question is especially puzzling when we consider that
by the late l870's the United States had recovered from the Civil War,
and its capacity for growth had become an established fact. That in-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
portunity is evidence enough that the economic potential of the
United States was held to be one of the brightest. Why, under such cir-
cumstances, was the inflow of foreign capital, at its highest, only one-
tenth of net capital formation and a small percentage of the national
product?
Part of the answer lies in the size of the would-be lender countries
compared with that of the would-be borrowers—even if we limit the
latter to those countries where expectations would warrant the prog-
nosis of favorable and vigorous economic growth. Before World War I
the major creditor countries were the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany, with the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland providing
limited additional funds. The would-be borrowers comprised not only
the United States, the largest and in many ways most promising coun-
try, but also some countries in northwestern Europe (Denmark, Sweden,
and Norway), Japan, several Latin American countries, Canada, and
other British dominions. Even on the extreme assumption that all the
savings generated in the would-be creditor countries were available for
investment abroad, the supply to the would-be borrower countries,
while much larger than the amount actually borrowed, would not be
much larger relatively—given conditions in those countries that favored
a vigorous flow of domestically originated savings. It must be remem-
bered also that even where conditions were not very favorable to
vigorous growth, as in some of the would-be borrower countries listed
above, conditions for foreign investment established through specia'
privileges encouraged some, and perhaps substantial, foreign invest-
ment. Although the economic prospects in India were, by and large, less
favorable than those in the United States, the special relation of Great
Britain to India warranted and required a flow of capital funds from
the British Isles to India, leaving fewer British funds for investment
elsewhere. In other words, the channeling of foreign capital is affected
not only by the economic conditions, referred to above as the pros-
pects of economic growth, in the would-be borrower country, but also
by the noneconomic factors of political dominance and political ex-
pediency. The distribution of foreign capital investments by recipient
areas, even before and especially after 'World War I, reveals the extent
to which such investments followed not merely the economic prognosis
of the long-term growth potential of the borrower country but the
political factors. In fact, a substantial proportion of the foreign capi-
tal flow was a matter of political necessity, for instance, the large
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volumes of capital invested in Russia (by France), in the Balkan coun-
tries, and in colonies dominated by the European powers.
But what limited the share of total savings originating in the lender
countries that could be diverted to investment abroad? This question
applies not only to the countries that in fact were creditors, but even
to those that were not. Consider Russia as a specific illustration: it
could be argued that any possessor of investment funds, even located
within that country, would have concluded, upon a careful appraisal
of prospects, that by the end of the nineteenth century and certainly by
the twentieth it would be, in the long run, far safer to shift the funds
into investment in the United States or Canada than keep them in
Russia. The same argument applies even to an underdeveloped coun-
try like China. One may ask why Britain failed to invest all its current
savings in foreign countries, where the prospects of economic growth
were distinctly brighter than at home. One may also ask why possessors
of funds in underdeveloped countries, confronted with difficult and
recalcitrant economic and social problems at home, with dim pros-
pects of successful solution and with the dangers of a breakdown fairly
obvious, failed to channel their funds abroad—particularly to such
promising areas as the United States.
This question, artificial and rhetorical as it may seem, points di-
rectly to one obvious but nevertheless important factor in the situation:
all the savings of a country are not available for investment abroad.
Assume that an English—or a Russian, or a Chinese—merchant realizes
a total net income on his enterprise substantially in excess of with-
drawals for use in ultimate consumption, and that he has, therefore, a
net profit available for investment. Even if the net profit emerges in
the form of easily disposable funds rather than larger inventory or
larger stock of fixed capital, the very profitability of the enterprise
makes attractive the reinvestment of the funds in the enterprise in the
form of increased equity. This additional investment will then be un-
der the control of the merchant and, combined with his continued
participation and other already invested assets, will promise a sub-
stantial return. The yield on such accumulated savings invested in
fixed-return foreign securities, while viewed as "safe," could hardly
match the expected prolits in one's own business. In addition, invest-
ment in foreign equities would either require active participation—
and thus mean, in effect, migration of the investor as an active entre-
preneur—or call for the exercise of judgment in the choice of equity
stocks under conditions of comparative ignorance. And what is true
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of the illustrative case of savings originating in a private trading firm
is true of a wide variety of savings closely connected with the activi-
ties and desires of the individual saver and therefore far from free to
flow abroad—savings generated by ultimate consumers in preparation
for bulk outlays (such as residential housing), gross savings arising out
of depreciation allowances in going enterprises, and the like.
The development of the elaborate complexes of intermediate finan-
cial institutions has, of course, facilitated the mobilization of savings
and made possible diversion of at least part of such flow into foreign
investment and, for that matter, into investment elsewhere within the
domestic economy. Indeed, this is an important strand of modern eco-
nomic growth. One major difference between developed and underde-
veloped countries lies precisely in the capacity of the former to develop
the financial institutions that mobilize savings, amassed at various
points for various purposes, and pooi them in funds in which they
have much greater fluidity, permitting them to be channeled into uses
that are likely to be economically more productive in the long run. All
that is argued here is that in any given country a large part of the
savings originates with a specific destination in the mind of the saver;
that this condition may—and most likely will—restrict the savings to
the uses the savers intended; and that such uses, being often indis-
solubly associated with the desire to combine the savings with other
domestic resources, will keep them from flowing freely abroad.
To put it differently: the yield of savings or capital funds is con-
ditioned by their combination with other resources. The potential
growth of the United States means one thing to an investor who would
accompany his savings to this country and add to the participation of
his savings his own active participation in the process of growth. It
means something different, and much less lucrative, to an investor who
would limit his participation to the purchase of fixed-interest securities.
And there are many gradations between the active participation of the
former and the coupon clipping of the latter. The basic reason for the
far from complete flow of savings, gross and net, from countries with
low growth prospects to countries with high economic growth poten-
tials has to be sought in the very factors that would explain the lack
of complete mobility of people between two countries (which would
equalize their current and prospective real income per capita): igno-
rance of foreign conditions as against familiarity with conditions at
home; the large margin of error that necessarily attaches to any long-
range forecast, and such a forecast is involved in the movement of
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people and capital funds; and the heavy cost of dislocation and re-
adaptation to new economic and social conditions. People migrate
only when the pressures at home become exceedingly great, and sav-
ings migrate only when the supply of funds exceeds that needed for
investment at home.
It is this complex of factors that explains why even in the major
creditor countries, and even in the most favorable periods as, for ex-
ample, from the late nineteenth century to World War I, only part of
gross savings originating at home became available for investment
abroad. In the United Kingdom, funds flowing into foreign invest-
ment in 1870—1913 averaged somewhat less than one-half of domestic
gross capital formation.' It also explains why practically no capital
funds flow abroad from underdeveloped countries. The reason is not
so much the low rate of savings in these countries as the emergence
of savings in forms not accessible to free flow. Those savings that are
accessible can often be used at home, by users familiar with domestic
conditions, in ways that yield exceedingly high returns—temporary
though they may prove to be if the pressing weight of domestic eco-
nomic and social problems causes a radical change in the country's
political and social framework.
All these factors help to explain why the flow of capital funds into
the United States was not greater than it was, and some of them apply
not only to the distribution of savings among countries, but also to
the apportionment of savings among various uses within a country.
They will, therefore, bear upon the analysis of the distribution of
domestic capital formation that follows. Finally, some of the points
relate also to the next question: why, in the course of our development,
the net changes in foreign claims have shifted from negative to posi-
tive, from net capital imports to net capital exports.
2. The reversal from net capital inflows to outflows and, eventually,
from net debtor to net creditor position occurred in this country, as
in many others, partly as specific historical events occasioned by
transient circumstances such as wars, and partly as results of trends
in economic growth. Even the war-conditioned circumstances of the
shift in capital flows may be viewed as part of a wider complex of
trends, and it is these that are of particular interest here.
Insofar as a greater potential for economic growth and prospects of
1SeeSimon Kuznets, "International Differences in Capital Formation and Financ-
ing," Capital Formation and Economic Growth, Special Conference Series, No. 6
(Princeton for NBER, 1955), Table 11-4, Part B, p. 70.
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higher yields in a country induce a flow of capital funds into it, that
flow is likely to originate in countries that have already attained a high
level of economic development and maturity where the needs for capi-
tal are less acute and the expected returns on it are lower. The differ-
ences among countries in the potential for economic growth during
the last one to two centuries are to some extent a function of the time
differences among them in adopting the new industrial technology and
in equipping themselves with modern capital and attaining higher
levels of economic productivity. Certainly the industrial revolution in
Britain preceded that in the United States by one-half to three-quarters
of a century. The point to be stressed, however, is that the complex
of circumstances that brought about the early industrialization and
modern economic growth of Great Britain also made it inevitably an
active participant in World War I. That became a world war and
involved large economic magnitudes precisely because by that time
modern economic growth had spread to France and particularly to
Germany. The complex of circumstances that delayed industrialization
in the United States—its distance from the seat of the old economic
civilization of Western Europe and the abundance of its land rela-
tive to population, which made agriculture the dominant economic
activity for so long—also minimized its active participation as a bellig-
erent in World War I. In that sense, the large positive change in the
net balance of foreign claims in World War I in the United States was
not an historical accident. It was part of the complex of trends that
accounted for the difference in stage of economic growth between the
United States and Great Britain through the nineteenth century, and
that set earlier the conditions for net capital imports from Britain to
the United States. Somewhat similar reversals in the flow of capital
occurred during World War I in several Scandinavian countries and
in Japan. And the following general proposition may be argued: inso-
far as net capital imports characterize countries with the large eco-
nomic growth potentials associated with a late entry into the phase of
modern industrialization, and insofar as the late entry determines their
position in the "new" world, outside the area of the "older" economic
units, world wars—which involve the major advanced and thus older
economic units—are usually accompanied by major reversals in the
How of capital funds. Such reversals are partly a matter of repatriation
by the older creditor countries, partly advances by the younger debtor
countries. It may well be that such an outflow would also have oc-
curreci in the United States in World War II, except that by that time
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the relevant foreign capital balances in the United States were small
relative to the demands of the conflict, and the position of the United
States as a world power subject to direct threat warranted the liberal
use of its resources for assistance to its allies, largely in the form of
unilateral transfers. It is this pattern rather than that of World War I
that is likely to persist in any major war that may arise in the future.
Even if there had been no world wars, other forces would have pro-
duced a shift in this country from net capital imports to exports, al-
though it might have occurred less precipitously. First, in the process
of modern economic growth and industrialization, accompanied as it
was by improvements in means of transportation and communication,
reliance on imports of raw materials increased markedly. The United
States used far more raw materials from abroad in the mid-twentieth
century than it did in the mid-nineteenth century, even propor-
tionately to the much greater volume of commodity production.
Whereas imports of manufactured goods lead eventually to an at-
tempt to produce them at home, imports of raw materials often lead
to direct purchases of their sources and to an attempt to control their
production to assure their supply in the form and at the rate most
suitable for domestic needs. The well-known trends in the composition
of exports and imports of a country as it becomes industrialized are
away from the dominance of raw materials in exports to dominance
of manufactured goods, and away from the dominance of manufactured
goods to dominance of raw materials in imports. These trends induce
parallel trends in direct investment abroad. Dependence upon mi-
ports of raw materials is conducive to direct investment in the pro-
duction of raw materials abroad, whereas dependence upon imports
of manufactured products is conducive to attempts to start their
production at home. Dependence upon exports of raw materials does
not lead to branch plants abroad, but dependence upon exports of
manufactured products does. There was, consequently, a second group
of reasons for this country to increase its direct investments abroad
(and this would be true of any industrialized country)—the setting up
of branch plants of manufacturing and industrial enterprises. This
enhanced its creditor position except in those instances where invest-
ment abroad was disguised as a native unit with no indication of its
control or ownership from the outside. Given these pressures for raw
materials ownership and industrial branch plants abroad, itissig-
nificant that already by 1900 private United States assets abroad
amounted to about $0.9 billion, of which over 80 per cent were in the
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form of direct investment, and that even by 1946, of $17 billion of
total private assets abroad, almost one-half were direct investments.2
One need not stress the obvious fact that the economic growth of a
country that provides these stimuli to direct investments abroad also
increases its knowledge and political prestige, both of which render
such foreign investments more attractive to the country's economic
units.
There is a third group of factors—the growth of a system of financial
institutions and practices that mobilizes savings, making them more
accessible to foreign portfolio investment, if the latter is warranted.
As part and parcel of modern economic growth, an increasing propor-
tion of the country's economic community becomes involved in and
habituated to the network of developed financial institutions. Clearly,
large sales of foreign bonds and securities like those in the United
States in the 1920's would not have been possible at the end of the
nineteenth century, when the banking system and other financial in-
stitutions were far less developed, when the proportion of individual
savers that dealt in securities and other financial instruments was far
lower. The greater externalization of savings, which accompanies eco-
nomic growth, obviously facilitates the flow of funds abroad provided
the conditions are favorable, just as it facilitates the flow of funds into
large-scale economic investment at home.
Finally, the role of the federal government, at least in the historical
period with which we are dealing, is not to be overlooked. Much of
the capital flow abroad that led to the reversal in net changes in foreign
claims was due to government transactions and decisions, and not ex-
clusively in connection with armed conflicts. The growth in the
economic power of this country permitted the government, when na-
tional interests were involved, to force a flow of funds abroad in the
form of loans (which, unlike unilateral transfers, affected both the
net capital position and subsequent current flows) that might not have
occurred merely in response to the stimulus of market conditions on
private business enterprises. But even though these foreign loans
stemmed from government decisions, they were still a function of
the country's economic growth. Clearly their contribution to the re-
versal in net changes in claims against foreign countries was condi-
tioned, or at least made possible, by the rise in the country's economic
resources and power.
2SeeRaymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, Vol. 1
(Princeton University Press, 1955), Table K-7, p. 1093.
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& The preceding comments make it unnecessary to deal at length
with the last question—what factors limited the net capital outflow
from the United States to small proportions of national product and
even of capital formation. In a way, the question is easily answered by
pointing to the successive periods distinguished in Tables 10 through
13. Capital exports during World War I were substantial, amounting
to over one-third of net capital formation and about one-sixth of gross
capital formation. During 1923—1928, investments abroad obviously
had to compete with large capital needs at home for reconstruction
equipment and expansion of domestic output. During the depressed
period 1929—1940, absolute volumes of net capital exports were kept
down by unfavorable economic conditions, but they were large rela-
tive to total or domestic net capital formation. During World War II,
the huge outflows of resources abroad did not add to claims against
foreign countries only because they were gifts, not loans. And after
World War II, despite the great domestic need for capital goods, capi-
tal flow abroad was substantial, particularly if we take account of
unilateral transfers. If we treat the latter as negative items, net changes
in claims in this recent period amount to 7 per cent of net capital for-
mation, but if we treat them as positive items, the proportion mounts
to well over one-third of net capital additions.
If we disregard political and unilateral transfers, capital exports are
obviously limited by the forces that make for direct investment abroad
and those that set the feasible amount of portfolio foreign invest-
ment. The former are partly technological and partly economic func-
tions of economic growth and of the change in industrial structure ac-
companying such growth. Little can be said about them, except that
the inducements to control foreign supplies of raw materials or facil.
itate exports by setting up branches of manufacturing and other plants
can necessarily account for only a small fraction of national output,
and of total capital formation. Portfolio foreign investment is limited
by domestic competition for savings. The whole question of the de-
mand for savings in the United States versus savings abroad is in-
volved. This problem was touched upon in Chapter 3 and will be dis-
cussed further in Chapter 10. All that need be said here is that the
long-run opportunities for further investment in this country, asso-
ciated with continuous technological progress and its effects on the
structure of demand and production, will probably preclude a large
margin for flow of savings abroad—especially since domestic needs for
capital are likely to receive a higher priority on many economic
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grounds. It is, therefore, difficult to say whether, even if the political
and social conditions abroad in the recent past had been as favorable
as they were in the second half of the nineteenth century, net capital
exports from this country would have constituted higher proportions
of capital formation and national product than they actually did. For
it must be remembered that while unfavorable political conditions
reduced the flow of capital abroad under private auspices, they forced
the flow of this country's resources abroad, either as grants or loans,
under government auspices. And one would be hard put to guess
whether, with favorable political conditions and without the govern-
ment-sponsored flows of resources abroad, net capital exports of a
purely business character would have been proportionally greater.
Neither the United Kingdom nor France can be used as an example
in this connection, since this country is much larger, and capital.
demanding technological potentials have changed, so that the pro.
portion of United States savings flowing abroad cannot be expected
to equal the proportions that flowed from the United Kingdom and
France. It must also be remembered that in the latter countries,
politically motivated capital exports loomed quite large. We must,
therefore, conclude—rather unsatisfactorily—that net changes in claims
or net balances of flows of resources across the boundaries are a com-
ponent which, if determined by purely economic forces, would not be
proportionately large in a country like the United States. But that
component is greatly affected by political and other noneconomic ele-
ments, and its importance in our analysis and prognosis depends
largely upon the weight we wish to assign to those elements.
Structure of Capital Formation, by Type of Capital Good
Having considered that part of capital formation in this country fi-
nanced from abroad or constituting net additions to claims against
foreign countries, we turn to the distribution of domestic capital forma-
tion—gross and net additions to stock of commodities within the coun-
try that may be considered tools of production, and hence, capital.
One customary distribution that will be discussed in the present sec-
tion distinguishes construction (buildings, roads, and other construc-
tion), producers' durables (machinery and equipment), and net changes
in inventories. The basic reason for this classification lies in the span of
economic life of units in the three categories. Buildings, roads, bridges,
and so on continue in use for a long time, and the conversion of
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their original value into current product extends over decades. Pro-
ducers' equipment or machinery has a much shorter economic life
span, but is also measured in years, the standard life assumed in our
calculations being thirteen years. Inventories are sold or "turned-
over" relatively quickly, the inventory-annual output ratio varying
from 0.2 to about 0.3 in manufacturing, and averaging about the same
in many branches of retail trade. Presumably, such differences in the
span of economic life—the period during which the value of the capi-.
tal item is translated into finished product and its cost recouped—are
of major importance in the problem of financing, since funds for a
capital investment that will not be fully amortized for fifty years will
be tied up that long, whereas funds for inventories can presumably be
viewed as a short-term investment. There are also consequential dif-
ferences on the demand side in the economic factors that determine
the rate of long-term versus short-term capital investment.
Two aspects of this customary classification warrant stressing. First,
the basis of the classification is the economic, not the physical, life of
the capital item. A disk harrow in the hands of a firm selling agricul-
tural machinery is part of inventory, and its economic life is assumed
to be brief, since the average period during which it will remain in
stock is at most a year or two, and once it is sold, the firm's funds will
no longer be tied up in that item. The same disk harrow in the hands
of the farmer who purchases it will last ten to fifteen years and is a
producers' durable item. Its economic life is assumed to be fairly long,
because the user is expected to charge its depreciation and amortiza-
tion to cost of annual product for years to come. Economic life is
largely a matter of the intent and practice of the economic unit that
disposes of the capital item in question, rather than a matter of physi-
cal properties, although the latter naturally exercise a permissive or
limiting effect. 'Where physical life is short, it is impossible to have
long economic life—eggs as eggs cannot become an item of producers'
durable equipment.
Second, the distinction by length of economic life is valid for each
physically identifiable capital item, not for the total economic value
of the complex. We think of inventory as relatively short-lived because
we expect the physically identifiable items to be sold more or less
promptly, their value to be converted into cash, the firm to have the
option to replace them or not, and the creditor to have the opportunity
3SeeMoses Abramovitz, Inventories and Business Cycles, with Special Reference
to Manufacturers' Inventories (New York, NBER, 1950), Table 114, p. 569.
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to renew the loan or not. But when we think of inventory as a whole—
its economic magnitude—we realize that a minimum volume isin-
dispensable in the life of the firm. To operate, the firm will require
x million dollars of inventory, just as it will require y million dollars
of buildings and machinery, and in this sense the economic life of in-
ventory as a whole is the same as the life of the firm.
As a consequence, one can easily envisage a situation in which long-
term credit is legitimately advanced to finance additions to inventory,
so long as that credit goes to a firm with a growing market and is
used for additions that constitute the indispensable minimum in long-
term expansion. One can also envisage short-term funds being ad-
vanced to finance a long-lived machine or building, so long as the firm
makes a depreciation charge allowance that can, within the year, be
used toward repayment of the loan, rather than being economically
mortgaged to the financing of some indispensable replacement.
Yet these are exceptional cases. By and large, the short economic life
of inventories, on the margin—that is, the additions to them—does
permit a check upon the profitability of investment in them, a check
that is impossible with the complex of capital equipment tied up in
a railroad, for example, or in a house. Granted that the physical and
technological characteristics of capital items act largely as permissive
or limiting conditions rather than determining factors, the economic
forces operating through the decisions of firms and other economic
units follow patterns that reflect these underlying differences in physi-
cal and technological characteristics—if only obliquely. And we should
not neglect the customary distinctions that mirror these patterns, for
from them we should be able to learn what factors guided capital for-
mation in the past and are likely to affect it in the future.
After these introductory remarks we turn to the statistical evidence
in Table 14—percentage distributions of countrywide capital forma-
tion. The distribution that is of most interest to us here is that of
domestic capital formation classifiedinto construction, producers'
durables, and net changes in inventories. For the sake of completeness
we also present the percentage distribution of total capital formation,
which includes net changes in claims against foreign countries, dis-
cussed in the preceding section; and finally, the distribution of durable
capital alone (construction and producers' durables), to bring out more
clearly the difference in trend movements between the two.
For guidance among the five parts of Table 14, the following notes
may be useful:
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First, let us indicate the scope of the items. Construction represents
the value of construction work put in place, including the installed
value of equipment, which is an integral part of a structure—house,
plant, bridge, road, harbor installation, and the like—and including
what are usually designated major repairs and alterations, but ex-
cluding ordinary repairs and maintenance. Producers' durable equip-
ment includes machinery and similar items of considerable size, but
excludes hand tools and minor types of equipment often chargeable
to current expense. Inventories are stocks of commodities that are
held for sale or for further fabrication, or are in process of fabrication.
Construction comprises both private and public—including military
construction unless specifically excluded—and that done under con-
tract as well as that done on force account. Producers' durable equip-
ment covers both private and public, including munitions unless mili-
tary capital formation is specifically excluded. Inventories are, for
conceptual reasons, limited to those in the hands of business and gov-
ernment agencies and exclude stocks within households; for statistical
reasons they are limited to business inventories (including farm), there
being no data on government inventories for the early years. However,
the available series show the latter to be quite small, except for stocks
of expendable (nondurable) munitions—which were enormous during
the war years.4 We excluded them because their inclusion would pro-
duce gyrations in the inventory item that would dwarf and conceal any
economic movements in inventory levels.
Second, the structure by type of capital good is shown for four coun-
trywide totals of capital formation: gross capital formation, in cur-
rent and in constant prices; and net capital formation, also in cur-
rent and in constant prices. In addition, since the inclusion or exclu-
sion of military construction and munitions affects the distributions,
particularly for the decades beginning with World War I, we show the
4At the end of 1949, public inventories in 1929 prices amounted to $2.4 billion,
accounting for almost 5 per cent of the total of $50.4 billion. This high level of
public inventories may be due largely to recent accretions, because before 1934
(except in the few years associated with World War I) and back to 1897, pub.
lic inventories were well below $100 million, while total inventories grew from
$16 billion to $38 billion. The only noticeable modification in the estimate of net
changes in inventories that would be introduced by the addition of public inven-
tories would be in 1929—1938, when the item would add $0.11 billion per year to
our total. For the estimates, see R. W. Goldsmith, Dorothy S. Brady, and Horst
Mendershausen, 4 Study of Saving in the United States, Vol. III (Princeton Uni-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
percentage distribution for each of the four totals including and ex-
cluding those military items.
Third, our interest here is in the long-term trends in the structure
of capital formation, not in its changes during business cycles, not
even (until we reach a later stage in our analysis) in the changes dur-
ing the long swings that have characterized the rate of economic growth
in this country. We therefore need averages for periods of at least
twenty-five to thirty years.
Those averages can be calculated in two ways. In one, the percentage
shares of construction, producers' durables, etc., in the countrywide
total can be calculated for each decade and then the decade shares
averaged for the longer periods. In the resulting average all decades are
weighted equally, although the absolute volumes of capital formation—
the bases to which the percentage shares are computed—may differ
markedly from decade to decade.
Such averages, when calculated, proved to be erratic, as they would
be if the absolute volume of capital formation in any decade was low
and if any large component was negative. That was true for net capi-
tal formation in the 1929—1938 decade, and it distorted the three-
decade averages toward the end of the period. We therefore adopted
the alternative procedure: the absolute volumes were averaged for suc-
cessive periods of three decades each and the percentage shares were
calculated from those averages. Such averages are weighted by the
volume of capital formation in each decade, and they therefore assign
the heaviest weights to the decades in which capital formation is largest.
We used arithmetic means to preserve the additive relation of the
components.
Fourth, scrutiny of the movements of percentage shares in net
capital formation for recent decades suggested the possible value of a
series based upon an alternative set of capital consumption estimates—
for producers' durables (excluding munitions) and for construction
other than nonfarm residential and government. For the former com-
ponent, our present estimates of capital consumption for the decades
since 1919 are based essentially on business depreciation shifted to a
cost of replacement basis and supplemented by estimates of capital
charged to current account. We link those totals with estimates for the
earlier decades based upon straight-line depreciation and the assump-
tion of a thirteen-year economic life. Comparison for the years since
1919 of consumption estimated on this basis with that based on busi-
ness accounts indicates that (as mentioned in footnote 1 of Chapter 3)
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the average volumes for long periods are about the same, but the esti-
mate based on business accounts is more variable, more responsive to
changing business conditions, than that based on straight-line deprecia-
tion. Thus, the business accounts measure of depreciation falls markedly
short of the straight-line life total during the depressed decade 1929—
1938 and exceeds it substantially in the 1940's and 1950's. To secure
better continuity in our estimate of consumption of producers' dur-
ables we used as an alternative for the entire period an estimate based
directly on the assumption of a thirteen-year economic life. The sec-
ond modification in our standard estimate of capital consumption—
for construction other than nonfarm residential and government—was
to exclude the charge for depletion. As indicated in Appendix A, we
consider the charge for depletion a proper deduction from current
capital formation. But there may be disagreement concerning such
treatment, and depletion volumes have risen rapidly in recent years.
It seemed advisable, therefore, to consider an alternative that would
exclude this charge. The totals of net capital formation based upon
these alternative estimates of depreciation of producers' durables and
"other" construction and the resulting percentage shares of compo-
nents are shown for volumes in 1929 prices in part Da of Table 14. The
modifications have only a minor effect on the trends in the aggregates,
but they affect more significantly the movement in some components
in the recent decades.
We now list the findings suggested by Table 14, seriatim.
1. The percentage share of net changes in claims against foreign
countries in gross capital formation, whether in current or in 1929
prices, rose to a peak in the thirty-year period centered on 1909—1918,
and then declined (parts A and B). The share was not large, varying
from —1.8 per cent to +8.1 per cent. As already indicated, the level
was held down in the recent decades by huge unilateral transfers made
abroad on government account. But we can say that the proportional
importance of private foreign investment in total gross capital forma-
tion has declined significantly from the peak levels in the period from
1915 to 1929.
Net changes in foreign claims loomed much larger as shares in net
capital formation, ranging_even for the thirty-year periods used here—
from —3.1 per cent to +2 1.1 per cent (parts C, D, and Da). The rise in
the share of net changes in foreign claims in net capital formation
continued almost to the end of the period, the peak being in the period
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centered on 1919—1928 or on 1929—1938, combining the decades of the
1920's and the 1940's. We can say, in general, that relative to net capi-
tal formation, capital investment abroad continued at comparatively
high levels until quite recently when world conditions and the emer-
gence of large unilateral transfers by government—as well as a huge
expansion of domestic capital formation—brought the percentage
share down.
2. The share of net changes in inventories in domestic gross capital
formation varied for the thirty-year periods from 4.1 per cent to about
15 per cent. The trend in the share was generally downward: a decline
is observed in both parts A and B of Table 14, that is, whether based
on current or constant price values, whether for totals including or
excluding military capital formation. And the decline was quite
marked. On the basis of the totals in current prices, the share of net
changes in inventories in domestic gross capital formation shrank
from 14.7 per cent to 4.1 per cent, or to less than three-tenths its
original level. When the components of domestic gross capital forma-
tion are adjusted for price changes (part B), the drop in the share of
net changes in inventories is reduced somewhat, but even then it is
from roughly 10 per cent at the beginning to 5 per cent at the end
(for totals including military), or to 6 per cent (for totals excluding
military).
No such clear-cut decline is evident in the movement of the share of
net changes in inventories in domestic net capital formation (parts C,
D, and Da). For the totals in current prices, the share declined from
almost 26 per cent and then rose again, and toward the end of the
period, particularly when we exclude the military, itis no lower
than at the beginning. Hence, for the totals in current prices, it is
safest to conclude that there is no significant evidence of a major long-
term decline in the share of net changes in inventories in net capital
formation. With the adjustment for price changes, the pictureis
altered somewhat: the share is slightly higher in the later periods
than in the earlier—well over 20 per cent as against 17 per cent, the
rise being even more marked for the totals excluding military capital
formation.
This effect of the adjustment for price changes is clearly due to the
differential price movement. Prices of the goods constituting inven-
tories must have risen less or declined more (obviously the former, be-
cause over the period as a whole the trend in prices has been upward)
than have the prices of the sum of the other two components of do-
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mes tic capital forma tion—construction and producers' durables. This
was caused largely by the construction component (although for totals
including military, the high price of munitions also had some effect
in recent decades), in which a lesser rise of productivity than in most
other sectors of the economy made for a differentially higher price
level at the end of the period than at the beginning. With prices of
goods entering inventories rising less than other prices, their 1869
prices are a higher fraction and their post-1929 prices a lower frac-
tion of 1929 levels than are the comparable prices of construction plus
producers' durables. Because the multiplicand in the conversion to
1929 prices is the reciprocal of this fraction, it would be lower before
1929 and higher after 1929 than that for construction plus producers'
durables. For this reason the share of net changes in inventories in
constant prices (parts D and Da) is lower than that in current prices
(part C) in the earlier periods and higher in the later periods.
3. The share of construction in gross durable capital formation de-
clined, and that of producers' durable equipment rose (parts A and B).
The decline in the share of construction when we include military
capital formation—from about three-quarters to about one-half—is
more pronounced than when we exclude it, because the addition of
munitions to producers' durables is relatively greater than the addition
of military construction to construction.
The same trend is observable in the distribution of net durable
capital formation between net construction and net producers' dura-
bles (parts C, D, and Da). The levels of the shares and the slopes of the
trends are somewhat different, however. Thus, in general, in the early
periods the share of net construction in net durable capital formation
tended to be higher than that of gross construction in gross durable
capital formation. And the decline in the share of construction in the
net totals in 1929 prices was somewhat more precipitous than the
decline in its share in the gross total in constant prices. But all these
differences are in the nature of details. For the present it can be
stated that in current or in constant prices, including or excluding
the military items, for gross or net volumes, the share of construc-
tion in durable capital formation declined, which means that the rate
of growth of construction was significantly lower than that of pro-
ducers' durable equipment.
Several questions suggested by these findings warrant further dis-
cussion. (a) Why did the share of net changes in inventories in gross
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domestic capital formation decline? (b) Why did the share of net
changes in inventories in net domestic capital formation either remain
stable or rise? (c) Why did the share of construction in total durable
capital formation decline? (d) Why did the share of construction in
durable capital formation totals move differently from its share in
the net, and did this difference have any bearing on the ratio of coun-
trywide net capital formation to gross?
a. In dealing with the first question, we begin by assuming that
net changes in inventories and net capital formation embodied in
construction and producers' durables serve the same broad purpose in-
asmuch as they both measure additional equipment for the production
of an increment of goods. This assumption is not implausible: in-
ventories are used in the extraction, manufacture, and distribution of
commodities, as well as in the provision of services. Construction and
machinery are also used to produce commodities and services. The
product-mix for any specific complex of structures and machinery will
differ from that for any other, and it will differ from that associated
with specific groups of inventories. But it can be argued that country-
wide inventories and the countrywide stock of structures and equip-
ment service the same product—the countrywide aggregate.
Let us assume also, pending further discussion, that the ratios of
inventories and of net durable capital to output are constant, and so,
therefore, are the marginal ratios—the ratios of net changes in in-
ventories and of net durable capital formation to net additions to
output. Under these conditions the average and the marginal ratios
will be the same. It follows from this assumption that the share of net
changes in inventories in net domestic capital formation is also con-
stant.
But we are interested here in the share of net changes in inventories
in gross domestic capital formation. If their share in net domestic
capital formation is constant, their share in gross domestic capital for-
mation will be constant only if the proportion of capital consumption
(or of net capital formation) to gross capital formation is constant.
This can be seen from the following equations:
DCF (domestic capital formation)
DC (durable capital formation) + mv (net changes in inventories)
DGCF (domestic gross capital formation)DCG (durable capitalformation,gross) + mv
DNCP (domestic net capitalformation) =DCN(durable capital formation, net) + mv
If Inv/DCN isconstant and equal to a, mv =aDCN.DCG =
DCN+ B (capital consumption), and if B is a constant fraction of
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DCN, say k, it is also a constant fraction of DCG, and the equation will
readDGCF =DCN+ DCNk + mv =Inv(k/a)+ mv =Inv(l+ k/a),
and with k and a constant, mv will be a constant fraction or multiple of
DCG, or of DGCF.
As will be seen later, however, the proportion of capital consumption
to gross durable capital formation is not constant but increases, partly
because of the retardation of growth in the total of gross construction
and producers' durables, partly because of the growing importance of
the producers' durable component, which has an economic life span
shorter than that of construction. It follows that if the ratio of net
changes in inventories to net domestic capital formation is constant
and the proportion of durable capital consumption to gross durable
capital formation increases (or the proportion of net durable capital
formation to gross declines), the ratio of net changes in inventories to
gross domestic capital formation must decline—and this is the finding
indicated in Table 14.
As noted above, this explanation is based on the assumption that
the ratios of net investment in inventories and of net investment in
durable capital to additions to output are constant (and that conse-
quently the average ratios involved are also constant). But is this as-
sumption valid? Should we expect that each dollar of new output will
necessitate a constant number of dollars of net changes in inventories
and a constant, although possibly different, number of dollars of net
capital formation in construction and producers' durable equipment?
This brings us to the second question listed above—that relating to the
movement in the share of net changes in inventories in net domestic
capital formation.
b. Changes in inventories and in durable capital can be related to
changes in the aggregate product presumably made possible by the
former. The relevant comparisons are provided in Table 15, and a
few notes will explain the calculations involved.
Column 1represents additions to the annual output of finished
commodity product, in 1929 prices. It includes the commodity com-
ponents of flow of goods to consumers (perishables, semidurables, and
durables) at cost to consumers (because the distribution and transporta-
tion services involved in bringing commodities from producers to con-
sumers require both inventories and plant and equipment). It also
covers gross construction and gross producers' durables, including mili-
tary items—since the latter may be and are produced in any plant




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
in which we are attempting to measure.5 From the annual series of
finished commodity output we derived changes for thirty-year periods
corresponding to the three-decade periods used in measuring net dur-
able capital formation and net changes in inventories. Thus we ob-
tained the growth in annual output of finished commodity product
from 1869 to 1899, to compare with net durable capital formation and
net changes in inventories for 1869—1898; from 1879 to 1909, to com-
pare with 1879—1908; and so on.
Two variants of net durable capital formation are studied in Table
15. The first covers all net construction, including military (because
the latter can be used to produce the military items in construction and
producers' durables), and all net producers' durables except munitions
(because munitions, by definition, cannot be used to produce other
commodities). This first total, appearing in column 2, includes non-
farm residential construction which cannot be conceived directly as
a tool in the production of finished commodities. It also includes gov-
ernment construction, some of which may be in the form of munition-
and other commodity-producing plants, but most of which can be
assumed to produce services not embodied in commodities. The second
variant of net durable capital formation (column 4) excludes nonfarm
residential and government construction, and is perhaps more directly
relevant to our purposes. For both variants of net durable capital for-
mation, we have the alternative estimate based upon the alternative
series of capital consumption for producers' durables and "other" con-
struction, discussed in connection with Table 14. Finally, net changes
in inventories are shown in column 6. All the entries are in 1929
prices; and the thirty-year cumulative totals of net capital formation
in columns 2, 4, and 6, are compared with the additions to the annual
output of finished commodities in column 1.
The results can be stated simply. The ratio of net changes in in-
ventories to net additions to finished commodity output, while fluctuat-
ing, remained at roughly the same level through most of the period
5 We exclude services not embodied in finished commodities, Le., the services
component of flow of goods to consumers, although some inventories and some
durable capital are used to produce these services. For example, medical practitioners
use both inventories and durable capital and so do cleaning and dyeing establish-
ments. But the construction, equipment, and inventories employed in this sector
of the economy must be relatively small, and their ratio to total net output much
lower than that for commodity output. It seemed to us that a much clearer picture
of the ratios of changes in inventories and in durable capital to output would
emerge if services not embodied in commodities were excluded from output.
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covered, with a distinct decline only in the periods that include World
War II and the subsequent decade. The movements of the ratios of
net durable capital formation to additions. to finished commodity
product are quite different. These marginal capital-output ratios rose
perceptibly to a peak in the thirty-year period centered on the first
decade of this century, and then declined precipitously. This sharp
decline is observed whether we deal with net durable capital formation
including or excluding nonfarm residential and government construc-
tion, and whether we employ the standard depreciation estimate or the
alternative. Even during the 1946—1955 decade, the ratio of net durable
capital formation to net additions to commodity output, as shown in
part A, was considerably less than one-half that reached at the peak,
1889—1918, and, as shown in part B, it was only slightly more than one-
half. Clearly, greater commodity output could be produced with a
smaller net addition to construction and producers' equipment.
This is a trend already observed, in somewhat different form, in
Chapter 3. It is associated partly with the change in technology and
in the rate of growth, and partly with the fact that a larger proportion
of capital consumption and replacement to total gross durable capital
formation means greater opportunity for introducing more efficient
equipment, and this reduces the need for net durable capital forma-
tion. In the present connection, it is the change in technology and
particularly the utilization of capital replacement to increase efficiency
(a factor that is not present in the case of inventories) that may have
caused the greater decline in the marginal net durable capital-output
ratio than in the marginal inventory-output ratio. And as a result—
at least in the calculations using the weighted averages—the share of
net changes in inventories in total net domestic capital formation rose.
One cardinal qualification of this finding must be introduced at
this point. The estimates of construction and the flow of producers'
durable equipment, like all economic estimates, are based on imperfect
data. But we do have at decennial or shorter intervals back to 1869 the
basic census data that permit us to distinguish construction materials,
and machinery and equipment, and a variety of subsidiary data to
provide a relatively firm foundation for the estimates. No such an-
chorage in basic data is available for the estimates of some of the major
components of inventories before the 1920's, particularly manufactur-
ing and trade. For these we assumed that net changes were a constant
ratio of changes in output or activity—the ratio prevailing in the 1920's.
This assumption may have introduced a false stability into the mar-
159Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
ginal ratios of inventories to output in Table 15, which, of course, is
the reason for the secular rise in the share of net changes in inven-
tories in total domestic net capital formation.
Agricultural inventories are estimated on the basis of census data,
and their secular movements are different from those of nonfarm in-
ventories. It may therefore be of interest to distinguish farm from
nonfarm and to observe the long-term trends in the structure of net
changes in total inventories by groups (Table 16). Our estimates run
through 1938, but for the distinction between farm and other inven-
tories we can extend the record another decade by means of Gold.
smith's estimates.
Net changes in farm inventories (which include changes in live-
stock) were a rapidly declining proportion of total inventory change.
Regardless of the validity of the estimates of nonfarm inventories, this
trend is beyond question. For one thing, agriculture constituted a
diminishing fraction of the total commodity output of the economy,
and it would be surprising if farm inventories did not likewise ac-
Count for a declining share of the country's inventories. Second, the
substitution of machinery for animals resulted in an absolute dim-
inution of the number of horses and mules on farms, and the growth
in other livestock was far slower than could have been true of in.
ventories either in manufacturing or in trade. For the present purpose
the important consequence is that, if we consider net changes in non-
farm inventories alone, they would presumably account for an even
more rapidly rising proportion of net domestic capital formation than
would net changes in total inventories. In part B of Table 16, where
the share of changes in nonfarm inventories in both gross and net do-
mestic capital formation is calculated, the rise of the share in net
domestic capital formation is striking, more than doubling from 1869—
1898 to 19 19—1948. But even the share of changes in nonfarm inven-
tories in gross domestic capital formation fails to show any significant
decline, the difference in movement between the marginal ratio of
nonfarm inventories to output and the marginal ratio of durable capi-
tal to output almost completely offsetting the effects of the increasing
proportion of capital consumption to gross durable capital formation.
The calculation in part B of Table 16 is not quite logical, however.
Changes in nonfarm inventories are compared with durable capital
formation, which includes construction and equipment designed to






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
marginal ratios of durable capital and inventories to output, excluding
the farm or agricultural sector from all terms of the comparison.
Exclusion of the farm sector can be only approximate, and yet the
results have sufficient validity to merit examination. In Table 17, net
changes in finished commodity product are those shown in Table 15,
reduced by an estimate of net income originating in agriculture. This
reduction excludes the contribution of agriculture proper, without
eliminating further fabrication, transportation, and distribution of
the products of agriculture and without eliminating the products other
industries may have contributed to agriculture. The totals in columns
2 and 4 are net durable capital formation (the former including, the
latter excluding, residential and government construction, and both
excluding munitions) minus the estimated construction and produc-
ers' durable equipment channeled into the agricultural sector. Finally,
net changes in nonfarm inventories are derived from Table 16 and,
being net of farmers' inventories, are dominated by two categories—
manufacturers' and trade stocks.
The movements of the marginal ratios of durable capital and of
inventories to output are not unlike those in Table 15. For net dur-
able capital formation excluding residential and government con
struction, the ratio in Table 17 rises from 1.81 to 2.53 and declines to
0.36, whereas that in Table 15 (for a comparable period) moves from
1.71 to 2.55 and then to 0.41. The similarity persists for the ratio based
upon values derived from the alternative estimate of depreciation. In
Table 17, the marginal ratio for inventories declines from between 0.6
and 0.7 to 0.5; that in Table 15, from between 0.7 and 0.8 to below 0.5.
But the decline in the marginal ratio for inventories is still far smaller
than that in the marginal ratio for net durable capital; and in any
calculation using as a base net domestic capital formation, excluding
the agricultural sector, the share of net changes in inventories will
show a secular rise, and that of net durable capital formation, a decline.
But how plausible is the basic assumption underlying this trend?
Is it likely that the marginal ratio of inventories to output in manu-
facturing and in trade remained constant from the 1870's to the 1920's
and at the level prevailing in the 1920's? Here, for lack of specific evi-
dence, conjecture can run rampant. It can be argued that technological
improvements in transportation and communication would in general
make for a lower marginal ratio of inventories to output or sales,
because it would not be necessary to hold as much inventory against












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
that improvements in manufacturing processes, insofar as they reduce
the time required to produce a given item, would lower the ratio of
inventories constituted by stock in process to the total finished output
of the plants. It can be argued that improved efficiency in trade, par-
ticularly in the form of larger units with a high stock-turnover ratio,
would reduce the marginal ratio of trade inventories to sales. On the
other hand, several arguments can be adduced for expecting an upward
trend in the inventory-output or inventory-sales ratio: the greater de-
tail in manufacturing production may make for a longer production
process; the higher standard of living and the demand for wider se-
lection may force trade units to hold stocks that are larger relative to
sales volume; the greater dispersion of consumer markets, combined
with greater concentration of producer centers, may make for large
inventory holding at various focal points to bridge the gap between
producer and consumer. Finally, there is the whole question of the
changing product-mix. Different branches of manufacturing and trade
are characterized by different inventory-output or inventory-sales ratios;
and intersector shifts within manufacturing or within trade might
produce trends in the aggregate ratios, even though the ratios within
each sector of manufacturing or trade remained constant.
For lack of specific information, it is not easy to appraise these sev-
eral conjectures. By and large, if,as we would have expected, the
marginal ratio of inventories to output declined in the long run, net
changes in inventories in the earlier decades are underestimated in
our measures; and their share in total net domestic capital formation
should show a decline rather than constancy or a rise. But this hypothe-
sis is doubtful, if only because the marginal ratio of net durable capi-
tal to output was increasing through the thirty-year period terminat-
ing in 1918. The factors making for this rise, particularly the estab-
lishment of new large plants and units that were built for the long
run and which in the early years of their use were operated at a rate
below their maximum capacity, would also make for a high rate of in-
ventories to current output. And the interindustry shift within manu-
facturing and the interbranch shift within trade would also militate
against a decline in the inventory-output or the inventory-sales ratio.
For, in this long-term change in structure, the durable goods sectors
with their higher inventory-output or inventory-sales ratios were be-
coming more important relatively than the perishable goods sectors
with their low inventory-output or -sales ratios. When we calculate the
over-all ratio for manufacturing for 1899 and 1929, using Abramovitz's
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inventory-sales ratios for 1919—1938, by major branches,° and Fabricant's
estimates of value added in the same branches for 1899 and 1929, we
find that it rises from 22.7 per cent to 22.9 per cent. This is a small
rise indeed, but a rise nevertheless; and from 1869 to 1899 there might
well have been an even greater rise. In trade also, the recession in im-
portance of wholesale trade, and particularly of products that flowed
directly from producers to consumers without going through trade
channels,8 as well as the shift within retail trade in favor of the more
durable types of commodities, would tend to sustain the ratio of trade
inventories to total finished output in the economy.
While it is impossible, therefore, to come to firm conclusions, it
is perhaps not unwarranted to infer that the marginal ratio of in-
ventories to finished output, if it did decline from the 1870's to the
1920's, could not have declined appreciably; and that there is some
validity to our finding that the share of net changes in inventories in
total net domestic capital formation in constant prices has risen over
the long period from the 1870's to the post-World War II decade.
c. In dealing with the trends in the structure of durable capital
proper—specifically the decline in the share of construction and the
rise in the share of producers' durable equipment—the first relevant ob-
servation is that construction is a much more heterogeneous total than
producers' durable equipment. As measured here, construction in.
cludes nonfarm residential and related housing, and other structures
above ground and underground—roads, bridges, streets, sewers, and
many more. It thus includes capital items designed directly for the
use of ultimate consumers (such as residences); those designed for the
use of both ultimate consumers and business producers (such as roads
and other common carrier installations); those designed for the exclu-
sive use of governments and other public institutions; and finally,
those intended for use as tools of commodity production in the hands
of business firms (including farmers). There is considerable variety
also in the type and user of producers' durable equipment: it includes
equipment for farmers as well as for nonfarm enterprises, for gov-
ernment installations as well as for private firms. But it is narrower
and more homogeneous than construction in that it excludes con-
6SeeInventories and Business Cycles, Table 30, p. 133.
7SeeSolomon Fabricant, assisted by Julius Shiskin, The Output of Manufacturing
Industries, 1899—1937 (New York, NBER, 1940), p. 635.
8SeeHarold Barger, Distribution's Place in the American Economy since 1869
(Princeton for NBER, 1955), Table 20, p. 70.
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sumer durable commodities and, particularly in the variant excluding
munitions, is heavily dominated by machinery and equipment destined
for use by producing firms in the private business sector.
Consequently, any reasons for the slower growth in the volume of
construction than in the volume of producers' durables can be more
easily established if we distinguish at least the major categories of
structures. The classification in Table 18 is based upon detailed esti-
mates given in the reference tables (see Appendix C). It distinguishes
nonfarm residential construction and construction on government ac-
count. "Other" construction is a residual still too mixed for our pur-
poses. For example, it includes institutional construction, which could
be separated for recent decades only. It is nevertheless a useful category,
because itis predominantly construction used by producing enter-
prises in the business sector and, hence, much more comparable in
scope with producers' durables than is total construction.
The trends in the distribution of the gross volume of construction
are clear and conspicuous. The share of government construction rose,
whether or not we include military construction, from considerably
less than one-tenth in the first thirty-year period to about one-third in
the last. The shares of nonfarm residential and "other" construction
both declined—the former from about four-tenths to about three-
tenths, the latter from well over one-half to somewhat above one-third.
And the share of "other" construction, dominated by industrial plant
and office buildings, declined more than the share of nonfarm residen-
tial. Thus the share of nonfarm residential construction in gross non-
government construction would rise, and that of "other" construction
would decline.
The trends in the distribution of the net volume of construction are
affected by the estimate of depreciation for "other" construction. If we
use the standard estimate, net "other" construction is negative in
1919—1948 and 1929—1955. If we use the alternative estimate of de-
preciation for "other" construction, the net volume of "other" con-
struction is still negative in 1919—1948, but the decline is not so sharp,
and the distorting effects on the percentage distributions, not so great.
Despite the differences between these variants of net construction,
we can still come to fairly firm conclusions. First, the share of govern-
ments in net construction shows a conspicuous upward trend, whether
or not we include military construction. It rises from about 6 per cent




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
even in 1946—1955, when private construction was high, the share of
governments was about one-fifth or more.
The share of nonfarm residential construction in net construction
does not decline. It is roughly stable if we use the alternative estimate
of depreciation; and rises if we use the standard estimate. This trend
is different from that of the share of nonfarm residential construction
in gross construction. The two trends differ because capital consump-
tion of nonfarm residential construction grew at a lesser rate than
capital consumption of "other" construction. This, in turn, is because
the retardation in the rate of growth of nonfarm residential construc-
tion was less than the retardation in the rate of growth of "other"
construction.
It follows that the share of "other" construction in net construction
declined, whatever variant of depreciation we use and whether or not
we include military construction. Indeed, the marked decline in the
share of "other" construction in total construction—whether gross or
net—is the major conclusion from Table 18.
We are thus led to the following inference. In the decline of the
share of gross construction in gross durable capital formation, the
lower rate of growth of nonfarm residential construction was a con-
tributing factor, but the major factor was the even lower rate of growth
of gross "other" construction. In the decline of the share of net con-
struction in net durable capital formation, the lower rate of growth of
nonfarm residential construction was a contributing factor but with
less weight; and the major and dominant factor was again the even
lower rate of growth of net "other" construction. Government con-
struction, since it grew rapidly, did not contribute to the decline in
the share of construction in total durable capital formation. In short,
it is the much slower growth of "other" construction relative to that of
producers' durables (with which it is most comparable in scope) that
accounts for most of the shift in the distribution of durable capital in
favor of producers' equipment.
"Other" construction is predominantly for the strictly business sec-
tors—mostly nonagricultural plant, roadway (for railroads), utility, and
office construction. It is a tool, therefore, for much the same commodity
product that is served by producers' durable equipment, despite the
minor differences in scope of the aggregate output turned out by
these two complexes of capital items. The much slower rate of growth
in "other" construction than in producers' durables means that the
ratio of changes in the former to changes in output has declined more,
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or risen less, than the ratio of changes in the latter to changes in output.
The movements of these ratios can be observed directly (Table 19).
The comparisons in Table 19 are similar to those in Tables 15 and
17, except that "other" construction and producers' durables, including
or excluding agriculture, are related to net changes in finished com-
modity output, including or excluding the contribution of agriculture.
But here we have gross volumes of construction and producers' equip-
ment as well as net volumes. The former are included in the analysis
to reveal whether the trends in the marginal capital-output ratios are
substantially affected by the allowance for capital consumption.
The movements in the marginal capital-output ratios are quite simi-
lar for the several variants. The ratio of "other" construction to changes
in output rose to a peak in the period 1889—1918, and then declined
sharply: the gross ratio dropped to less than one-third of the peak
level, and the net ratio turned negative. If the middle decade can be
taken as the more exact date of the secular level of a thirty-year average,
the peak ratio of "other" construction to changes in output can be
said to have been reached in the 1899—1908 decade; and the drop since
then has been particularly sharp in the periods including the World
War II and postwar years.
The ratio of producers' durables to changes in commodity output
follows a different secular pattern. The gross ratio, and the net ratio
based on the standard depreciation estimate, rose to a peak in the
period 1909—1938, while the net ratio based on the alternative deprecia-
tion estimate reached a peak in the period 1899—1928. But despite a
decline from those peak levels, the ratios in the later periods are sub-
stantially above their levels in the early periods or above their previous
peak levels. Thus the ratio for gross producers' equipment is over 3.0
both in 1929—1955 and 1946—1955, compared with less than 2.0 in
1869—1898 and 1879—1908; whereas the ratio for gross "other" construc-
tion is 1.4 in 1929--I 955 and 1.2 in 1946—1955, compared with 2.7 and
3.1 in the first two thirty-year periods. Likewise, the net producers'
durables ratio (standard depreciation series) is well above 0.6 in the
most recent periods (over 0.7 in 1919—1948), compared with less than
0.6 in the first two periods. But the recent net "other" construction
ratio is either negative or a small fraction of the level that prevailed in
1869—1898.
In short, the shift in the structure of total durable capital forma-
tion away from construction toward producers' durables can be largely


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
ducers' durables. The latter shift, in turn, means that after roughly
the first decade of this century the marginal capital-output ratio for
"other" construction declined far more precipitously than did that
for producers' durables. The greater decline in the ratio for "other"
construction is evident even when we use gross volumes, that is, gross
rather than net capital formation. In other words, during recent decades
it has become increasingly possible to produce more finished com-
modities with absolutely and proportionately smaller gross or net addi-
tions to the stock of "other" construction than to the stock of pro-
ducers' durable equipment.
The explanation of the difference between the movement in the
capital-output ratio for "other" construction and that for equipment
requires an examination of output and capital formation for major
industry sectors, and a brief discussion along these lines is to be found
in a later section of this chapter. It may be said here that the explana-
tory model would have to distinguish trends in the relation between
construction and equipment and output within industries from trends
in the weights of different industries, characterized by different ratios
of construction to output and equipment to output. Thus, in a given
industry, say steam railroads, the records might suggest that in the early
stages of its growth the construction of track, stations, and so on formed
a large part of its durable capital formation, and the ratio of con-
struction to output was high and rising. Later, after the basic network
had been completed, the need for new construction, gross or net,
lessened, while technical progress stimulated the demand for new
producers' equipment. If the suggestion holds, the pattern for the rail-
road sector may be described as an early rise in the marginal capital-
output ratios, for both construction and equipment, succeeded by a
marked decline in the ratio for construction, and a lesser decline,
stability, or even a rise in the ratio for producers' equipment. This
pattern may have typified not only railroads but also other utilities,
many manufacturing industries, and so forth. However, there may
also have been simultaneously interindustry shifts. We are dealing
here with aggregates of "other" construction and producers' durable
equipment, even if we exclude agriculture. Within the total complex
of nonagricultural industries, sectors characterized by higher than
average ratios of construction to output may have predominated dur-
ing the early periods; and it may be that the decrease in their im-
portance brought about the precipitous decline in the marginal ratio
172Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
of "other" construction to output—even though within each industry
no significant decline occurred.
We can advance beyond such conjectures only after we consider the
more detailed evidence on the industrial distribution of durable capi-
tal. The present remarks are intended merely to indicate the lines that
a complete explanation would have to follow. And we now turn to the
last question raised above—the effect of the changes in structure of
capital formation by type of capital good on the ratio of capital con-
sumption to gross capital formation.
d. Our estimates of capital consumption are based largely on an
assumption of constant economic life and straight-line depreciation,
although for some components (nonfarm residential construction, for
example) and for recent decades somewhat different procedures were
followed. It can be demonstrated that if constant economic life and
straight-line depreciation are assumed, trends in the ratio of capital
consumption to gross capital formation will depend upon three var-
iables: first, the movement of the rate of growth in gross capital for-
mation (retardation in the rate increases the ratio of capital consump-
tion to gross capital formation and acceleration in the rate decreases
it); second, trends in the relative weight in gross capital formation of
the several categories subject to different economic life (e.g., an in-
crease in the weight of gross producers' durables relative to construc-
tion will raise the ratio of capital consumption to gross durable capital
formation); and third, trends in the weight in capital formation of
items subject to depreciation relative to those, already net, that are not
(net changes in inventories and in foreign claims). Clearly, a rise or
decline in the share of the nondepreciable items in gross capital forma-
tion would mean, all other conditions being equal, a decline or rise in
the ratio of capital consumption to gross capital formation.9
All three relations indicated above operated in part to raise the
proportion of capital consumption to gross capital formation. We
have already observed that the share of net changes in inventories in
gross domestic capital formation declined. For a while, the share of
net changes in foreign claims in total capital formation rose, but after
reaching a peak during World War I and in the 1920's, it fell. Thus,
the share of the nondepreciable components in gross capital formation
declined. We have also pointed out that the rate of growth of gross
9Foran algebraic analysis of these relations see Appendix B, in Kuznets, "Inter-
national Differences in Capital Formation and Financing," in Capital Formation and
Economic Growth, pp. 76-81.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
construction was slower than that of gross producers' durables, which
means that the share of the latter, with its shorter economic life span
and higher depreciation ratio, increased. Now, in Table 20, we observe
the movement in the rates of growth in the volumes (in constant prices)
of gross construction, gross flow of producers' durables, and their total
(columns 1, 2, and 3).
The period covered in Table 20 is too short for our purposes. It
should extend about fifty years further back for construction, and
about a decade and a half further back for producers' durables, since
current capital consumption is affected by earlier rates of growth in
gross capital formation. Nevertheless, it is clear even from the trun-
cated period covered that the rate of growth in construction shows a
sharp retardation, whereas retardation in the rate of growth in pro-
ducers' durable equipment is not nearly so marked. The effects on the
movement of the ratio of capital consumption to gross capital forma-
tion for these two categories of durable capital (columns 4 and 5, or 9
and 10) are conspicuous—particularly if we exclude the military items
from both categories. For construction (column 4), the ratio of capital
consumption to gross capital formation rose from less than one-half to
over eight-tenths. For producers' durables (column 5)it fluctuated
around seven-tenths, the only noticeable rise being in the period in-
cluding World War II and later years.
The most interesting item of evidence in Table 20, however, relates
to the ratio of capital consumption to gross capital formation for the
more comprehensive totals. Thus, for total durable capital formation,
the sum of construction and producers' durables, the ratio of capital
consumption to total gross volume, rose almost as much as did the
ratio for construction, even though there was no such rise in the ratio
for producers' durables. But it was the increasing weight of the latter
that served to sustain the rise in the proportion of capital consumption
to gross durable capital formation, from almost one-half to over eight.
tenths (column 6). We find similar rises in the ratio of capital con-
sumption to domestic and total capital formation—i.e., when capital
formation includes the nondepreciable components of net changes in
inventories and in foreign claims (columns 7, 8, 12, and 13).
Structure of Capital Formation, by Category of User
The ultimate purpose of capital formation is that of all economic ac-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
beings who comprise society, in whatever institutional and organiza-
tional framework. society sets up. Viewed in that light it does not
matter whether a capital item is bought directly by the ultimate con-
sumer for his own use (a house, for instance), is purchased by a busi-
ness firm to produce finished goods, or is procured by governments for
needs that are the responsibility of government agencies. In all these
cases, the three groups of users of capital equipment can be viewed as
delegates of society for the performance of identical functions. The
house owner, business firm, and government unit can all be viewed
as business units, either purchasing and planning the use of a capital
item in an economic calculus, or supplying the ultimate needs of
society, directly or indirectly.
While the function involved in capital formation is the same no
matter who the ultimate user of the capital item may be, the identity
of the user does make a difference—in the institutional arrangements
by which capital formation decisions are made, in the patterns of be-
havior with respect to these decisions, modes of financing, and the
like. While for some purposes we have to apply conventions to impose
uniformity, it would be misleading to let those conventions guide our
analysis. Thus in estimating national income, an owner-occupant of a
dwelling is treated as an entrepreneur, in the business of supplying resi-
dential services to himself; and net income originating is calculated
just as for a business firm, all relevant expenses, actual or imputed,
being charged against an imaginary gross rent. Likewise, in some ap-
proaches, governments are treated as huge business enterprises, whose
income is from tax receipts and other charges, and whose expenses are
in the form of factor payments or payments to other industries. But
such conventions should not lead us to assume that decisions by in-
dividuals on house purchase or construction, or by governments on
capital acquisition or construction, are similar in all major respects
to decisions by business firms; that the channels of financing are the
same; or that the lines of distinction between gross capital formation,
capital consumption, and net capital formation have quite the same
meaning.
It is of interest, therefore, to classify capital formation by the three
main groups of final users of capital items—households, business firms,
and government agencies. The percentage distributions in Table 21
suggest the levels of and trends in the shares of these three major
groups of final users in domestic capital formation.
176Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
Unfortunately, the classification permitted by the available data
suffers from many limitations, some stemming from conceptual diffi-
culties, but most of them due to the scarcity of relevant statistics. The
first set of difficulties relates to capital formation for households. As-
suming that we exclude consumers' durable commodities, for reasons
already discussed in Chapter 1, we should cover all residential housing,
whether farm or nonfarm. But the distinction between the farm resi-
dence and the part of the farm that serves productive purposes is dif-
ficult and artificial—particularly when the estimates are extended to
the early decades. We have, therefore, included farm residences with
the rest of farm capital and limited residential construction to non-
farm. The omission of farm residences is not important quantitatively:
Goldsmith's very rough estimates suggest an annual average gross
volume, in 1929 prices, ranging from somewhat over $30 million to
almost $300 million, and averaging less than $150 million for the period
1897_1949.b0 For the same period the gross totals of nonfarm residential
construction averaged almost $2.5 billion, or almost sixteen times farm
residential construction. A somewhat different question arises with
respect to nonfarm residential construction proper: some of it is owner
occupied, some is rented. Should we treat both parts as household
capital formation, or only the former—classifying the latter as business
because it is handled chiefly by business firms? We decided to treat all
of it as household capital formation, on the grounds that the distance
to the ultimate household user is quite short, and that renting part of
a two-family or multifamily house by an individual owner is often
little different from owner occupancy of a single family dwelling. De-
fined as nonfarm residential construction (excluding nonhousekeeping
units), the estimate of household capital formation is fairly complete.
The difficulties in estimating the government component are some-
what different: they all lie in the scarcity of data. First, as previously
indicated, changes in inventories do not include government inven-
tories; and, to the extent that inventories in the hands of governments
have increased, their total capital formation and share in the aggregate
are underestimated. Second, all producer equipment except munitions
is allocated to business, because we have no basis for a long-term esti-
mate of the share going to government agencies. Here again, the flow
of producers' durables to governments may have increased more than
the flow to business firms; and if so, the levels of and trends in the gov-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
ernment share in capital formation are understated. Finally, it would
have been desirable to include the nonprofit public institutions with
the government sector rather than with the business sector, which is
necessary because of lack of detailed data for long periods back. The
share of such institutions in the capital formation total has very likely
increased; and if they were included in the share of the total public
sector, the latter would be larger and might show greater growth. On
all these counts, the share of governments in capital formation is under-
stated. However, it appears from some alternative distributions pre-
sented below that the magnitude of the understatement may be ex-
aggerated.
It follows that the share of the business sector in total capital forma-
tion is overstated and may have an upward trend bias. But all these
qualifications are relatively unimportant, and certainly do not ma-
terially affect the clear long-term movements in the structure of capi-
tal formation by category of user.
Before summarizing the findings, it should be noted that the dis-
tribution in Table 21 is of domestic capital formation, because net
changes in claims against foreign countries cannot be allocated by
category of user. The users in this case in this country (rather than
abroad) would presumably be the holders of the claims—households as
individual owners of some claims against foreign countries, business
firms as direct or portfolio investors, and governments as owners either
of debt claims or of some material assets located abroad. No data in-
dicating such a distribution are available for the years before the
1920's; and the significance of such a distribution is questionable.
The movement that dominates the picture is the rise in the share
of the government sector. It is found whether we deal with gross or
net capital formation, in constant or current prices, and on either
basis of capital consumption. Furthermore, the rise is conspicuous.
From less than 5 per cent in the early period, the share rose—even
when military items are excluded—to about 16 per cent in the gross
totals, and to considerably more than 20 per cent in the net totals
(1929—1955, line 7a). We emphasize here 1929—1955 as the terminal
period, since the distribution for 1946—1955 may be too much affected
by transient elements. The broad findings would not, however, be
'much changed by the use of 1946—1955 as the terminal period.
As noted above, the share of governments tends to be understated
in our estimates. To evaluate the effects of the understatement, alterna-
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tive estimates based on Goldsmith's series on net changes in reproduci-
ble wealth (in constant prices) are presented. Inventories and pro-
ducer equipment in the hands of governments are included, but all
military goods are excluded. The results, for the broad periods that
can be distinguished, appear in Table 22.
The table, a supplement, in a way, to Table 21, not only confirms
the rise in the share of the government sector, but also indicates that
the allowance for inventories and equipment produces little change in
the percentages. The shift from 6 per cent in 1880—1900 to somewhat
over 25 per cent in 1922—1948 (lines 8 and 10) is similar to the change
from 6 per cent in 1879—1908 to almost 27 per cent in 1919—1948 (Table
21, column 12 or 15, lines 2 and 6a). In other words, the direction and
TABLE 22
STRUCTURE OF NET DOMESTIC CAPITAL FORMATION, EXCLUDING MILITARY, BY






WEALTH, END OF YEAR
1. 1850 21.7 75.0 3.3
2. 1880 24.9 71.5 3.6
3. l900Ab 29.3 65.5 5.2
4. 1900B° 31.8 61.1 7.2
5. 1922 29.9 60.5 9.5
6. 1948 29.6 55.5 14.9
CHANGES IN WEALTH
(NET CAPITAL FORMATION)
7. 1850—1880 25.7 70.5 3.7
8. 1880_l900Ab 32.1 61.7 6.2
9. 1900B—1922 ° 28.0 60.0 12.0
10. 1922—1948 29.1 45.5 25.4
a Nonfarmresidential construction.
b Entries for 1900A are comparable with entries for earlier years.
oEntriesfor 1900B are comparable with entries for later years.
SOURCE: Raymond W. Goldsmith, "The Growth of Reproducible Wealth of the
United States of America from 1805 to 1950," Income and Wealth, Series II (International
Association for Research in Income and Wealth, Cambridge, England, Bowes and
Bowes, 1952), p. 307.
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magnitude of the rise in the share of the government sector in capital
formation would remain much the same even if our series included
equipment and inventories (excluding military items) in the hands of
governments.
The share of the business sector in capital formation declined in
all the variants, whether gross or net, whether in constant or current
prices, whether including or excluding military—with one interesting
exception. For the gross totals in 1929 prices (Table 21, column 5), ex-
cluding military, the moderate rise in the share of the business sector
after the turn of the century was followed by only a slight decline. On
the whole, therefore, the share of the business sector in those totals
shows no significant long-term decline. However, in the gross totals
in current prices the share declined, and in the net totals, whether in
current or in constant prices, it declined even more sharply.
The share of the household sector in total gross domestic capital
formation, whether in constant or in current prices, declined. Its
share in net totals in current prices was fairly stable, but in net totals
in constant prices, the share again showed a downward trend. In other
words, the share of the household sector declined in all variants except
that of net totals in current prices.
Since the rise in the share of governments dominates the percentage
distributions in Tables 21 and 22, we also analyze the private sector
alone and observe the shares of the household and the business sec-
tors (Table 23).
The share of the household sector (nonfarm residential construc-
tion) in gross private domestic capital formation declined—only slightly
for volumes in current prices, but quite appreciably for volumes in
1929 prices. The business sector, therefore, accounted for a somewhat
rising proportion of all gross private domestic capital formation. With
the shift to a net basis, the share of the household sector in volumes
in current prices rose, and fairly appreciably. The trend in the share in
net volumes in constant prices was, on the whole, downward. In short,
within private domestic capital formation proper, the business sector
tended to hold its own or even to rise, except in net volumes in cur-
rent prices.
The findings just summarized have already been explained in part
in the discussion of the trends in the structure of capital formation by
type of capital good. Nevertheless, it may be useful to deal briefly with




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital FormatiOn
sector in total capital formation; and (2) the reasons for the rising
share of the business sector in gross private domestic capital forma-
tion, and its declining share in net in current prices.
1. The rise in the share of the government sector in total capital
formation is a finding beyond doubt or qualification, and would be
observed even with alternative definitions of capital accumulation (for
example, one including consumers' durable commodities). While it
cannot be explained in full here, an effective approach would be to
view it as a product of two trends: the rise in the share of governments
in the total economic activity of the nation, and the relation between
this rise in activity under government auspices and the accumulation
of material capital needed to effect it.
The rise in the share of governments in total economic activity can
be demonstrated in various ways: by measuring the share of factor
payments originating in the government sector in national income;
by gauging the share of employment under government auspices in
the country's labor force; by estimating the share of the total finished
product of the economy purchased by government agencies; by ap-
praising the extent to which the activity of the whole economy, in-
cluding the private sector, is determined by decisions, acts, and policies
of the governments—whether in their regulating, inducing, or limiting
capacities. Each of these approaches would yield a clear picture of
the rising weight of governments in the functioning of the national
economy.
These trends, and the factors underlying them, have been discussed
elsewhere.11 There is little need here to repeat the discussion, except
by way of a capsule summary. One point to be stressed is that the very
pattern of the country's internal economic growth—the increasing
density of population in urban conglomerates, the growing scale and
complexity of the forms of economic organization, the increasing im-
portance of overhead capital that cannot be financed under private
auspices—has meant an increasing need for services and functions that
cannot be left to private business. The satisfactory operation of private
markets and private enterprise requires that the discrepancy between
returns to business and returns to society, particularly in the long run,
must not be large. For if the expected returns to business exceed the
11Notablyin the following National Bureau studies: Solomon Fabricant, The
Trend of Government Activity in the United States since 1900 (New York, 1952);
George Stigler, Trends in Employment in the Service Industries (Princeton, 1956);
and Morris A. Copeland, Trends in Government Financing (Princeton, 1961).
i83Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
social returns by too wide a margin, some resources will be di-
verted to uses that are not justified by the interests of society and that,
therefore, diminish the potential social product in the long run.
If the prospective returns to private business are smaller than they
should be from the standpoint of society, then too few resources with
high social priority will be employed.
With this general formula there may be far-reaching disagreement
in specific cases about what constitutes the social as against the private
net returns. Yet many illustrations may be cited. For example, with
the increasing density of population, and the consequently greater
need to protect public health, it would clearly be quite unsatisfactory
to leave epidemic control and other public health measures to private
concerns. They could not be expected to provide the necessary goods
and services at prices within the means of all groups in the population.
It would be dangerous not to employ the compulsive powers of gov-
ernment agencies in fields in which a few failures to conform (milk, mos-
quito, water control) would endanger entire communities. If—to use
another example—a private enterprise expands to such a size that the
preponderance of fixed costs inits financial structure makes com-
petition impossible, whereas the importance of its product makes
monopoly socially dangerous, only the government can intervene to
regulate such a potential monopoly and reduce the discrepancy be-
tween private and public costs and returns. As the structure of the
economy grows in complexity and as its parts are more closely inter-
related, an increasing proportion of activities in the private sector
assumes dominating public importance—in the sense that failure to
perform is a graver threat to the efficiency of the economy as a whole than
in earlier times when the various parts of the economy were more self-
sufficient. The continuous development of social and economic institu-
tions, which has been fundamental in permitting this country's econ-
omy to tap the increasing potential of economic productivity inherent
in the growing stock of useful knowledge, requires an increasing role
by the government in regulating, adjusting, and complementing those
institutions, whenever there is evidence that, left to themselves, they
may develop bottlenecks or misallocate resources from the point of
view of society as a whole.
Just as the economic growth of the country produced internal pres-
sure for greater activity by governments, so economic growth on an
international scale had similar effects within the historical period
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covered by our estimates. It was the spread of the modern industrial
system to an increasing number of large national units or empires
that provided, at least in the permissive sense, conditions in which in-
ternational discord could have economic effects and exercise economic
pressures. Before the emergence of new industrial powers (Germany,
Japan, and Russia), when Great Britain was the leading—in fact the
only—major industrial power and could enforce Pax Britannica
throughout a large part of the world, the threat to the United States
of major international conflicts was small. Since the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, however, that threat has increased steadily.
Given the growing share of governments in the country's total eco-
nomic activity, their share in countrywide capital formation would
increase if government activity required material capital, and if that
requirement—as expressed by the capital-output ratio for the govern-
ment sector—were not subject to a downward trend offsetting the up-
ward trend in the government share in total economic activity. We
have no evidence on the capital-output ratio for government activity.
For some major areas of government operation such a ratio would be
difficult to secure, because the activities served by the capital (streets,
roads, and so on) are not those of government proper. Unlike business
firms, which acquire capital goods to service their own productive
operations exclusively, or households, which gear acquisition of capi-
tal to their own specific needs, many of the capital goods acquired by
government agencies serve the broader purposes of society as a whole.
The capital-output ratio would therefore have a clear meaning only
for that part of government capital stock designed to service its own
operations (office buildings, military construction, and munitions).
It is reasonable to suggest, nevertheless, that, aside from the special
case of durable military material, the capital-output ratio associated
with government capital formation is certainly not lower than the
ratio prevailing for construction and equipment items elsewhere in
the economy; and that the trend movement in the government ratio is
at least not likely to show a greater decline or a lesser rise than that
in the capital-output ratio for the economy at large. What might be
called the utilities component of government capital formation, which
bulked quite large in the nonmilitary totals of government capital,
is in general characterized by a fairly high capital-output ratio. The
same is true of the construction component, such as office buildings,
associated directly with government operation. And as for the long-
term trends in the capital-output ratio for the government sector, it
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might be reasonably argued that, because of the absence of those con-
tinuous pressures to economize and raise the rates of utilization of
equipment that characterize use of capital in the private business sec-
tor (and to some extent even the household sector), we should not
expect the capital-output ratio for the government sector to decline
more or rise less than that for the economy at large. If this conjecture
is accepted, the rise in the share of governments in the country's total
economic activity would necessarily be accompanied by a similar, or
perhaps even greater, rise in their share in countrywide capital forma-
tion.
In connection with the rise in that share it may be useful to dis-
tinguish between capital formation of local and state governments and
that occurring under the auspices of the federal government. The
former would, by and large, be almost exclusively in response to in-
ternally generated needs associated with the domestic aspects of the
country's economic growth. Capital formation under direct federal
auspices, a mixed category, can reflect both internal and external
pressures, both domestic and foreign factors.
The distributions in Table 24 are quite suggestive. If the military
items are excluded, capital formation under state and local govern-
ment auspices (excluding federal aid) accounted for a dominating
share of government capital formation—between 80 and 90 per cent—
until the period covering the decade of the 1930's. It dropped below
80 per cent only when the Great Depression necessitated increased fed-
eral government financing of state and local capital formation, and
again when World War II and the postwar years led to a far greater
volume of federal construction, even nonmilitary (as housing). It is
war, beginning with World War I, and the increasing demands it
makes that change the picture radically. One can distinguish two quite
different phases in the long record of government capital formation in
this country. In the early phase, urban services—road building, educa-
tion, public health, and other peacetime functions of government—
grew apace and required capital formation largely under the auspices
of state and local governments. In the later phase, problems of war
and defense became dominant and, in turn, exacerbated internal
problems—of stability and depression (for clearly, the depression of
the 1930's was partly a post-world-war phenomenon), of internal mi-
gration, of regional disparities—calling for multiplication of activi-
ties and capital formation under federal auspices, both military and
nonmilitary. Because wars are violent phenomena, one can hardly
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TABLE 24
DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERNMENT GROSS CAPITAL FORMATION, CURRENT PRICES, BETWEEN




Share of State and
Local, Federal












1. 1869—1898 a 84.5 0 15.5 0 15.5
2. 1879—1908 83.9 0 16.1 0 16.1
3. 1889—1918 a 87.0 0.3 13.0 54.1 43.6
4. 1899—1928 a 92.6 3.1 7.4 36.5 32.2
5. 1909—1938 a 87.2 14.0 12.8 27.1 31.4
6. 1919—1948 a 72.2 15.4 27.8 113.7 66.2
7. 1929—1955 sb 72.5 11.4 27.5 101.7 64.1
8. 1946—1955 77.1 7.2 22.9 75.2 56.0
Decades
(except line 17)
9. 1869—1878 82.3 0 17.7 0 17.7
10. 1879—1888 87.0 0 13.0 0 13.0
ii. 1889—1898 83.2 0 16.8 0 16.8
12. 1899—1908 83.5 0 16.5 0 16.5
13. 1909—1918 89.5 0.3 10.5 93.8 53.8
14. 1919—1928 95.2 4.6 4.8 23.2 22.7
15. 1929—1938 81.1 23.8 18.9 13.9 28.8
16. 1939—1948 53.7 14.7 46.3 234.9 84.0
17. 1949—1955 77.2 6.6 22.8 75.7 56.1
18. 1946—1955 77.1 7.2 22.9 75.2 56.0
Flow of nonmilitary producers' durables to governments is excluded.
Percentages based on three-decade moving totals of absolute volumes.
b 1949—1 955 given the weight of a decade.
SOURCE, BY COLUMN
(1) and (3) Calculated from unpublished estimates underlying Table R-30.
(2) Underlying absolutes from Construction and Building Materials, Statistical
Supplement, May 1954, Table 5; and Economic Report of the President, January
1957, Table E-30.
(4) For military construction and munitions, see Table R-6.
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call the movements associated with them trends. Therefore, lest the
thirty-year periods give a false impression of gradual and continuous
change, we provide decade distributions in the lower part of Table 24.
Yet, by and large, the last four to five decades of this century may
be considered "war dominated," compared with the "peaceful" decades
from 1870to1910.
2.While it is not difficult to explain the upward trend in the share
of governments in countrywide capital formation, the distribution
within the private sector between households (in our measures, non-
farm residential construction) and the business sector (including farms)
is more complicated. The reason lies in the fact that the determinants
of household capital formation and of business capital formation are
such different complexes. All we can do here is discuss further the
relations between these two sectors of private capital formation, and
the groups of variables to which they can be reasonably linked.
A detailed and thorough analysis of the factors that determine the
demand for nonfarm residential construction, and their effect on the
trends in that construction, is presented elsewhere.12 Clearly, growth
in population, change in the number of households, internal migra-
tion, the price of housing, and levels of income are all important ele-
ments in determining demand for residential housing in nonfarm areas.
Of this complex of factors, we analyze here only the growth in non-
farm population, and in part A of Table 25 we relate to it the gross
and net volumes of nonfarm residential construction, in constant
prices. The rate of growth in household capital formation is thus in-
terpreted as a function of two trends—additions to the nonfarm popu-
lation, and the ratio of construction to population additions. The
movement of the first of these two variables is portrayed in column 2;
the movement of the second is shown for gross construction (with
volumes for 1869—1898 related to population additions for 1870—1900,
and so on) in column 5, and for net construction in column 9. Thus
the trend in volume of construction is a product of columns 2 and 5,
or 2 and 9, and appears in column 6 or 10.
The model for business capital formation is somewhat more dab.
orate. We begin again with population, on the premise that its wants
are the governing determinant, as they are for the household sector.
But here (columns 1 and 2 of part B) we take changes in total rather
12LeoGrebler, David M. Blank, and Louis Winnick, Capital Formation in Resi-
dential Real Estate: Trends and Prospects (Princeton for NBER, 1956), particularly





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
than in nonfarm population, since it is the total increase in the num-
ber of inhabitants that has to be served by business capital. However,
we cannot directly relate population numbers to business capital for-
mation, as we do population numbers to residential construction;
rather, the linkage is through finished commodity product, which
business capital formation services. Hence, additions to total popu-
lation are viewed as stimulating additions to finished commodity
product (column 3), and we observe additions to commodity product
per number added to total population (column 4). The movement in
the per capita additions (column 5) multiplied by the movement in
additions to total population (column 2) yields the trend in additions
to finished commodity product (column 6). This trend, which char-
acterizes the element of growth that additions to business capital serv-
ice, is comparable with the trend in additions to nonfarm population,
which characterizes the element of growth that new nonfarm residen-
tial construction services. It will be noted that the growth rate of this
determinant of business capital formation tends to be higher than that
of the immediate determinant of nonfarm residential construction.
(Compare the entries in column 6 of part B with those in column 2 of
part A.)
If additions to commodity product grow at a higher rate than addi-
tions to nonfarm population, business capital formation will grow at
a higher rate than nonfarm residential construction if the marginal
capital-output ratio for the former declines less or rises more than that
for the latter. The comparison for gross marginal ratios is between
column 9 of part B and column 5 of part A; and for net marginal
ratios, between column 13 of part B and column 9 of part A. In the
earlier periods, the ratio of business capital formation to finished com-
modity product additions is definitely higher than that of nonfarm
residential construction to nonfarm population additions; but in the
recent periods, the former declined much more drastically than the
latter. On balance, however, the combination of these ratios with the
.movements in the basic determinants themselves yields a consistently
higher rate of growth in business capital formation than in nonfarm
residential construction for the gross volumes. But when we deal with
the net volumes, the greater decline for business capital formation
(column 12) than for nonfarm residential construction (column 8)
offsets the other factors and produces a stability in the share of non-
farm residential construction in net private capital formation. Note,
however, that this stability shown in Table 25 is for a period that omits
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the first decade (1869—1878) and the last quinquennium (1951—1955).
Over the longer period covered in Table 23, the share of nonfarm
residential construction in net private domestic capital formation de-
clines, at least for 1929 price volumes.
In part C the calculations show how differences in the rates of growth
are reflected in changes in the percentage shares of the household and
business sectors in total private domestic capital formation. The alge-
bra is quite simple. If for a given period the share of the household
sector is h, that of the business sector is (1 —h).If capital formation in
the former grows by the ratio (1 + a), while that in the latter grows
by the ratio (1 + b), the share in the next period will be: for the house-
hold sector, [h(1 + a)] ±[h(1+ a) + (1 —h)(1+ b)]; and for the busi-
ness sector, [(1 —h)(1 + b)] divided by the same denominator. Clearly,
if (1 + a) is smaller than (1 + b), the case more or less consistently for
gross volumes, the share of the household sector in private domestic
capital formation will decline, as demonstrated in part C.
This translation of changes in the relative shares of the household
and business sectors in total private domestic capital formation (in
1929 prices) into differences in rates of growth, reducible to differences
in rates of growth of relevant population additions and other sources
of demand, is of course not an explanation. It is merely another step in
the analysis toward the point at which the operating factors can be
more clearly discerned. But we still would have to answer several ques-
tions: Why were additions to nonfarm population changing at the rate
indicated (column 2 of part A)—at a rate higher than additions to total
population (column 2 of part B)? Why did gross or net nonfarm resi-
dential construction in constant prices per addition to nonfarm popu-
lation move as it did (column 5 or column 9 of part A)? Why did addi-
tions to commodity product per addition to total population grow at
the high rates indicated (column 5 of part B)? On the questions relat-
ing to the determinants and factors in the movement of nonfarm resi-
dential construction, we may refer again to the discussion by Grebler,
Blank, and Winnick, just cited. On the questions relating to business
capital formation, reference can be made to the material in the mono-
graphs that deal with agriculture, mining and manufacturing, and
the regulated industries, some of which will be summarized in the next
section of this chapter. At the present juncture all we do is pass from
the percentage distributions of private domestic capital formation to
the next stage, where the underlying rates of growth can be linked
to the most obvious determinants.
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If the distribution of private domestic capital formation in 1929
prices between the household and business sectors differs from the dis-
tribution in current prices, the discrepancy is assignable to differential
trends in the price levels. As observed in Table 23, in the distribution
of volumes in constant (1929) prices the share of the household sector
(nonfarm residential construction) declined, and that of the business
sector rose. If we do not observe the same trends in the distribution in
current prices, it is clear that the prices of capital items in the two
sectors moved differently.
This is brought out explicitly in Table 26. The price indexes in all
columns were derived simply by dividing the volumes in current prices
TABLE 26
PRICE INDEXES IMPLICIT IN HOUSEHOLD AND BUSINESS SECTORS OF PRIVATE Dossxsnc




























































8.1946—1955 223.4 179.0 226.1 169.4 161.5
a Nonfarmresidential construction.
1,1949—1955 giventheweight of a decade.
SOURCE, BY COLUMN
(1) to (4) Calculated from Table 23.
(5) Calculated from Tables R-3, R-27, and R-28.
by those in 1929 prices. It will be observed immediately that prices
implicit in the capital items in the household sector (nonfarm resi-
dential construction) rose more than those implicit in the capital items
in the business sector—a total of construction, producers' equipment,
194Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
and inventories. Whereas the prices implicit in the gross volumes in
the most recent long period, 1929—1955 (with the last seven years given
the weight of a decade), are, for the household sector, almost five
times the level in the first thirty-year period, those for the business
sector are not quite three times their level in the initial period. The
greater rise in prices of nonfarm residential construction may well be
due to a lesser rise in productivity and efficiency of the industries closely
connected with that sector and thus reflect their backwardness rela-
tive to those engaged in producing the construction, equipment, and
inventories that constitute business capital formation.
Such differences in the movement of prices can easily account for
the differences between the trends in the distributions of volumes in
constant and in current prices. Thus, looking back at Table 23, we
find that in 1869—1898 the share of the household sector in gross private
domestic capital formation, in 1929 prices, was 29.3 per cent. But its
share in current price volumes was only 23.6 per cent. The reduction
can be explained by the differences in the implicit prices for gross
volumes shown in columns 1 and 2, line 1, Table 26. If we multiply
29.3 per cent (the share of the household sector) by 38.6 (the price in-
dex for the household sector), and 70.7 per cent (the share of the busi-
ness sector) by 51.9 (its implicit price index), and divide the first prod-
uct by the sum of the first and second, the ratio will be 0.236 or 23.6
per cent, the share of the household sector, in current price volumes.
We can do that for every entry in Tables 23 and 26, translating the
movement in the shares of the household and business sectors in gross
or net private domestic capital formation in current prices into a
product of the movements of the shares in constant prices and of the
differential changes in implicit price levels.
This naturally does not mean that the changes in the structure of
private domestic capital formation in constant prices are basic, and
that the differential trends in the implicit price levels are a corollary
with only an additive effect on the former. On the contrary, it may
well be that the difference in the price trends partly determined the
distribution of capital formation in constant prices—in the sense
that the greater relative rise in prices of nonfarm residential con-
struction decreased the relative demand for it in physical volumes,
causing the share of nonfarm residential construction in total private
domestic capital formation, in constant prices, to decline.
In this connection, the last column in Table 26 has much suggestive
value. It contains the implicit price index of finished consumer com-
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modities (perishables, semidurables, and durables). Those commodities
form the preponderant part of finished commodity product, changes in
which appear in column 3, part B of Table 25, as one of the basic
determinants of business capital formation. In fact, we know that con-
sumer commodities account, on the average, for well over 70 per cent
of total finished commodity product (the rest being gross construction
and gross producers' durables, including munitions), and that their
share in the latter showed no distinct trend over the period. We found
in Table 25 that additions to finished commodity product (in constant
prices), largely consumers' commodities, per addition to total popula-
tion, rose at a higher rate than did new nonfarm residential construc-
tion (also in constant prices) per addition to nonfarm population. (Com-
pare column 5 of part A with column 5 of part B.) In other words, the
demand for additional units of consumer commodities grew at a higher
rate than the demand for new nonfarm residential construction did,
both expressed in constant prices. In Table 26 we find that the rise
in prices of consumer commodities was far less than the rise in prices
of nonfarm residential construction. We may therefore infer that the
higher ratio of secular additions to finished commodity product to
total population additions, compared with the ratio of new nonfarm
residential construction to nonfarm population additions is due, at
least in part, to the rising prices of construction relative to prices of
finished consumer commodities. If this inference is correct, the price
differential is another factor in the greater rise in business capital for-
mation in constant prices, that is, the rise in the share of the business
sector in total private domestic capital formation in constant prices.
The differentials in price trends not only provide a statistical account
of differences in movement between the shares of the household and
business sectors in private domestic capital formation in constant and
in current prices; they also suggest an economic argument which goes
part way toward explaining why, in volumes in constant prices, the
share of nonf arm residential construction tended to decline and that of
business capital formation tended to rise.
Shares of Selected Industry Sectors in Net Business Durable
Capital Formation
We come now to the last aspect of the structure of capital formation,
the distribution of net durable business capital formation among the
industries using durable capital. It would have been valuable to study
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the distribution of all business capital formation—not only durable
(which includes construction and equipment) but also inventories, not
only net but also gross, and not for a few but for all industrial divisions
that are likely to show different patterns of growth and different trends
in their shares in total business capital accumulation. The available
data, however, do not permit such an analysis even for recent years, let
alone for decades back into the nineteenth century. We are limited to
the distributions made possible by the basic monographs, in the series
on capital formation and financing, dealing with agriculture, mining,
manufacturing, and the regulated private industries (referred to below
as public utilities).'3
For these industrial sectors we can observe net durable capital for-
mation, i.e., net construction and equipment, back to 1880. Table 27
presents a summary of the data, in comparable form, designed to reveal
the long-term trends in the distribution of net durable business capital
formation by these four major industrial sectors.
The comparison is limited to durable capital, that is, excludes in-
ventories, because in some sectors, as the public utilities, long-term
estimates of inventories cannot be secured; and in others, as manu-
facturing, estimates of inventories by subbranches are not possible
over the long run. The estimates are limited to net volumes because,
for the earlier decades, capital formation in agriculture, mining, and
manufacturing, can be derived only as successive differences between
estimates of stocks, and those stocks are net values. Only for the public
utilities are both gross and net capital formation estimates available
back to the 1870's. Finally, we deal with fairly long periods in Table
27, not only because our interest is in long-term trends, but also be-
cause the estimates for some sectors are derived as net differences be-
tween successive large totals (which are subject to marked trends), and
the relative errors are likely to be smaller for long intervals than for
short.
While Table 27 omits some sectors of the economy whose capital
accumulation would be classified under business capital formation
(e.g. contract construction, wholesale and retail trade, other business
service), the missing sectors are not among the important users of
13 See the following, published by Princeton for the National Bureau: Alvin S.
Tostlebe, Capital in Agriculture: Its Formation and Financing since 1870 (1957);
Daniel Creamer, Sergei Dobrovoisky, and Israel Borenstein, Capital in Manufactur-
ing and Mining: its Formation and Financing (1960); and Melville J. Ulmer, Capi-
tal in Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities: its Formation and
Financing (1960).
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TABLE 27
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OFAPPORTIONABLE NET PRIVATE DURABLE CAPITAL FORMATION,
1929PRICES,1880—1948
(amountsin billions of dollars)
Agricul- Manufac-RegulatedTotal,
ture MiningturingIndustries(1) to (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Stock, June 1, 1880
2.Net capital formation, June 1, 1880—
June 1, 1900
3. Stock, June 1, 1900
4. Net capital formation, June 1, 1900—
Dec. 31, 1922
5. Stock, Dec. 31, 1922
6. Net capital formation, Dec. 31,1922—
Dec. 31, 1948
7. Stock, Dec. 31, 1948
8. Stock, June 1, 1880
9. Net capital formation, June 1, 1880—
June 1, 1900
10. Stock, June 1, 1900
11. Net capital formation, June 1, 1900—
Dcc. 31, 1922
12. Stock, Dec. 31, 1922
13. Net capital formation, Dec. 31, 1922—
Dec. 31, 1948
14. Stock, Dec. 31, 1948
A. CAPITAL STOCK AND CAPITAL FORMATION
6.57 0.37 1.88 11.80 20.62
2.20 1.20 5.76 9.18 18.34




6.56 3.70 14.88 14.41 39.55
15.33 5.27 22.04 35.39 78.03
3.21 0.06 12.74 9.90 25.91
18.54 5.33 34.78 45.29 103.94
B. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL STOCK AND
CAPITAL FORMATION
31.9 1.8 9.1 57.2 100.0
6.5 31.4 50.1
4.0 a 19.6a 539a
4.1b 18.6 b 545b
16.6 9.4 37.6 36.4 100.0
19.6 6.8 28.2 45.4 100.0
12.4 0.2 49.2 38.2 100.0


















15.1880 5.53 0.35 8.82 0.76
16.1900 8.99 1.130 23.18°
21.98b
3.16
17.1922 10.55 d2.560 50.570 9.60
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TABLE 27 (concluded)
Agricul- Manufac-RegulatedTotal,
ture MiningturingIndustries(1) to (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
K. RATIO OF CAPITAL STOCK TO OUTPUT
23. June 1, 1880
24. June 1, 1900
25. Dec. 31, 1922









1.19 1.06 0.21 15.53
0.98 1.39 0.33 a 6.64
1.45 2.06
1.03 0.92














38. June 1, 1880
39. June 1, 1900
40. Dec. 31, 1922
41. Dec. 31, 1948
I. RATIO OP CAPITAL STOCK TO NET PRODUCT
1.74 1.68 0.78 23.60 2.98
1.51 2.21 1.26 a 10.04 2.65 a
1.18b 2.62 b
2.28 3.29 1.58 5.65 2.73
2.02 1.47 0.98 2.50 1.57
Because of rounding, detail will not necessarily add to total.
Comparable with entry for 1880.
b Comparable with entry for later years.
Extrapolated from 1902 or 1919 by NBER index (see Harold Barger and Sam H. Schurr, The
Mining Industries, 1899—1939, New York, NBER, 1944, p. 14).
d Extrapolated from 1920 or 1950 by BAE index of farm production, Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1951, p. 507, and Historical Statistics, Series E-73.
Extrapolated from 1919 by NBER index (see Solomon Fabricant, The Output of Manufacturing
Industries, 1899—1937, New York, NBER, 1940, p. 44).








F. RATIO OF NET CAPITAL FORMATION TO CHANGES
IN OUTPUT
27.1880—1900 0.64 1.54 0.40 3.82 0.87
28.1900—1922 4.21 2.59 0.52 2.24 1.04
29.1922—1948 0.43 0.02 0.16 0.55 0.24
H. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF NET
54.7 3.2 34.9 7.2
39.6 4.8 41.3 14.2
23.5 5.6 49.0 21.9
13.8 5.5 53.5 27.2
J. RATIO OF NET CAPITAL FORMATION TO CHANGES
IN NET PRODUCT
42.1880—1900 1.08 2.45 1.57 5.77 2.36
43.1900—1922 7.37 4.16 1.88 3.46 2.85
44.1922—1948 1.31 0.03 0.59 0.84 0.69Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
(Noms TO TABLE 27)
SOURCE, BY LiNE
1, 3, 5, 7. Cols. 1—4: Data underlying the series in Table R-35.
15—18. Cot. 1: Conversion of series in line 1, Table 28, to 1929 prices by correction factor (147.1)
derived from Alvin S. Tostlebe, Capital in Agriculture: Its Formation and Financing since 1870
(Princeton for NBER, 1957), Table H-3, pp. 214—216.
Col. 2: Data supplied by Israel Borenstein.
Col. 3: Data supplied by Daniel Creamer.
Col. 4: From Melville J. Ulmer, Capital in Transportation, Communications, and Public Utilities:
Its Formation and Financing (Princeton for NBER, 1960), Table I-i, pp. 458 and 459.
30—33. Five-year averages centered on 1880, 1900, 1922, and 1948 were calculated for net national
product in 1929 prices, Variant I (Table R-26). An index of these averages was computed
with 1922 as the base year. The percentage shares of agriculture, mining, manufacturing,
and the public utilities in net national product in 1922 were assumed to be the same as those
for 1919—1928 in current prices shown in Simon Kuznets, "Long-Term Changes in the
National Income of the United States of America since 1870" (Income and Wealth, Series II,
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, Bowes and Bowes, Cam-
bridge, England, 1952), Table 17, p. 102.
Cot. 1: Lines 15—18 multiplied by the ratio of line 12 to line I in Table 28. The index of
the resulting product was calculated with 1922 as the base year. The ratio of this index to
that for net national product was computed, and its movement used to extrapolate the share
of agriculture in net national product. The latter, multiplied by this share, yielded the esti-
mate of net income originating in agriculture in the given year.
Cols. 2—4: For each industry an index of its output (lines 15—18) was calculated with 1922
as the base year. The ratio of the industry index to that for net national product was com-
puted and used to extrapolate the 1922 shares of the given industries in net national product.
Multiplying the resulting shares by the absolute value of net national product in the given
year yielded net income originating in the respective industries.
durable capital. According to the rough estimates of reproducible
durable wealth, the four sectors covered in Table 27 accounted in 1880
for about 80 per cent of the total net value of construction and equip-
ment in the business sector (i.e., excluding nonfarm residential con-
struction, and that owned by governments and nonprofit organiza-
tions). That percentage appears to have been sustained through the
recent decades.14 We are, therefore, dealing here with the industries
that account for about four-fifths of business durable capital formation.
The findings suggested by Table 27 are now listed.
1. The share of agriculture in net durable capital formation of the
four industrial sectors has remained fairly steady: it amounted to 12
per cent in 1880—1900, rose to 17 per cent in 1900—1922, and then de-
clined to about 12 per cent in 1922—1948. This more or less constant
level is surprising in view of the sharp secular decline in the share of
14 Simon Kuzriets, assisted by Lillian Epstein and Elizabeth Jenks, National Product
since 1869 (New York, NBER, 1946), Tables IV-5 and IV-6, pp. 218—219.
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agriculture in total output, as evidenced by the data in part D of the
table.
However, even though the share of agriculture in net durable capi-
tal formation failed to decline, it was at a level lower than that which
must have prevailed in the past. For in 1880, agriculture accounted for
81.9 per cent of the total stock of durable business capital, which means
that in the preceding decades the share of agriculture in the com-
parable total of current capital formation must have averaged at that
level. By 1900, however, agriculture's share in durable business capi-
tal had declined to 22.5 per cent, a reflection of the decline in its share
in output. By 1922 its share in durable capital had declined to 19.6
per cent, and by 1948, to 17.8 per cent.
2. The share of mining in net durable capital formation in the four
sectors was 6.5 per cent in 1880—1900 and rose to 9.4 per cent in 1900-
1922. For both periods the share was much larger than it must have
been before 1880, since its share in the durable capital stock of the
four sectors in that year was only about 2 per cent. With the much
larger share of mining in current net capital formation, its share in
total durable capital (of the four sectors) climbed from less than 2 to
almost 7 per cent. However, during 1922—1948, the volume of its capi-
tal formation was so small that the share of mining in total capital
stock had dropped to about 5 per cent by 1948.
3. The share of manufacturing in net durable capital formation of
the four sectors in 1880—1900 was close to one-third, far larger than
its share in the existing stock in 1880. The share in capital formation
increased continuously and, consequently, its share in the accumulated
stock increased. Whereas in 1880 the share of construction and equip-
ment used in manufacturing in the total for the four sectors was barely
9 per cent, by the end of 1948 it had risen to 33.5 per cent.
4. The share of the public utilities sector in the combined total
stock in 1880 was quite large—close to six-tenths. But from then on
the share in current net durable capital formation declined Continu-
ously, particularly sharply in the interval 1900—1922. In 1948, the share
of the sector in the total accumulated net durable capital was about
44 per cent, a drop of almost one-quarter from its 1880 level.
How can we account for these movements, shown in parts A and B,
in the distribution of net durable capital formation? Granted that
the estimates are subject to error,it seems clear that the broad
trends are not likely to be negated or changed much by refinements,
so long as we deal with net construction and equipment, and with
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these four sectors. Why, for example, should the share of manufactur-
ing in the total for the four sectors increase, and that of public
utilities decline?
The other parts of Table 27 help to resolve these trends into a
combination of differential movements in the volume of output which
the capital stock is to serve, and in the capital-output ratios, average
and marginal.
In part C we have gross output—gross in that payments to other in-
dustries have not been deducted, although intraindustry duplication
within agriculture is adjusted for. From our standpoint, it would have
been preferable to use estimates of net output, specifically net income
originating (or net plus capital consumption charges); and in part G
we do have approximations to net output. But these approximations
are quite rough, and the available data permit more accurate and de-
tailed estimates of gross output. \'Ve should, therefore, emphasize the
movement in capital, in gross output, and in the capital-gross output
ratios, even though some inferences as to the movement in net output
and in the capital-net output ratios are possible.
As might be expected, the share of agriculture in the total of gross
output for the four sectors declined quite steadily; the shares of both
the manufacturing and public utilities sectors rose quite steadily; and
the share of mining rose until 1922 and then declined. On the basis of
these trends in the structure of gross output, we would expect the
share of manufacturing in net capital formation to rise continuously
and that of mining to rise through 1922 and then decline, which is
exactly what happened. We would also expect the share of agriculture
in capital formation to decline, and that of public utilities to rise, but
instead, the share of the former shows little change and that of the
latter declined. Clearly, the capital-output ratio for agriculture must
have moved quite differently from that for the public utilities sector,
and both quite differently from those for mining and manufacturing.
This, an algebraic necessity, is what we find in part E. In agriculture,
the ratio of capital stock (buildings, machinery, and implements) to
output shows no definite trend over the period. In the public utilities
sector, the capital-output ratio dropped precipitously, from a high of
over 15.5 in 1880, to a low of 1.6 in 1948. The ratio in mining rose
from 1.06 in 1880 to 2.06 in 1922, and then dropped sharply to 0.9 in
1948. The ratio in manufacturing more than doubled from 1880 to
1922, and then dropped markedly, but the trend over the period as a
whole was upward. The weighted ratio for the four sectors combined
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dropped moderately from 1880 to 1922, and then appreciably from
1922 to 1948.
Part F, which shows the marginal ratios—i.e. the ratios of net capital
formation to gross output additions—emphasizes the extreme variabil-
ity in these ratios, even for huge sectors like manufacturing and the
public utilities, in which conflicting movements among the various
branches may be expected to cancel each other, at least in part. In
general, the marginal ratios during the first two intervals were high
and rising for agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, but were a!-
ready declining for the public utilities sector. In the last interval, 1922
to 1948, there was a general drop in the marginal ratios, and this uni-
formity of direction in movement for the four sectors is reflected in
the sharp break in the ratio for the total.
The picture suggested by Table 27 is clear: by and large the aver-
age capital-output ratios in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing
did not decline significantly or at all, over the period as a whole. It
is the ratio for the public utilities sector—very high initially—that
showed the most consistent and largest decline. On the other hand,
the manufacturing capital-output ratio—very low at the beginning of
the period—showed a sizable rise, at least to 1922. As a result, the four
ratios tended to converge: in 1880, the range was from 0.21 to 15.5; in
1948, from 0.27 to 1.64. When we omit the public utilities sector, the
range narrows—that in 1880 being from 0.21 to 1.19, that in 1948, from
0.27 to 1.03.
In parts G to J we repeat the analysis, this time for the movement
in net output and in the capital-net output ratios in the four sectors.
The estimates are based essentially upon the sector shares in net na-
tional product in 1919—1928 (in current prices), extrapolated to earlier
and later decades by the movement in rates of growth of gross output
compared with that of net national product (both output and product
series in 1929 prices). These estimates therefore assume constancy over
time in the ratio of net to gross output within each sector, and for
this reason can be viewed as only rough approximations. The only
exception is for agriculture from 1910 on, for which we have direct
estimates of both gross and net output, in constant prices.
The general conclusions suggested by parts G to J are the same as
those suggested by parts C to F. In the movement of output, there is
again the marked decline in the share of agriculture, the marked rise in
the shares of manufacturing and public utilities, and the rise to 1922
in the share of mining and its slight decline thereafter. The capital-net
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output ratios are all significantly higher than those based on gross
output, but their movement over time is similar except that the
ratio for agriculture rises over the period as a whole. The marginal
capital-net output ratios are even more variable than the marginal
capital-gross output ratios.
Behind these movements in output and capital lie a variety of
factors, many of which are discussed in the monographs from which
the data are taken. It may not be amiss to consider some further de-
tail, lest the simple story told by Table 27 leave a false impression. It
is especially important to see whether the trends observed in the capi-
tal-output ratios remain the same when we vary the definition of capi-
tal and of output; and whether, by subdividing the major sectors, some
light can be shed on the nature of the factors behind the trends.
We turn first to agriculture (Table 28) and consider two questions.
(1)Is the movement in the ratio of net construction and equipment to
net income originating the same as the movement in their ratio to
gross income? (2) How does the movement of the capital-income ratio,
when capital is limited to buildings and equipment, compare with the
movement in the capital-income ratio when capital is defined more
widely, or consists of other combinations of components?
The first question is answered simply by comparing the movement
in line 7 with that in line 18. Considering only the period covered in
Table 27, 1880—1950, we find that the ratio of net durable capital to
gross income rose from 1.05 in 1880 to 1.27 in 1920 and then declined
to 1.01 in 1950—confirming the movement already shown in Table 27.
Over the period as a whole, there is no clear evidence of either an
upward or downward trend in this ratio. But the ratio of net durable
capital to net income originating moved from 1.22 in 1880 to 1.58 in
1920 and, after some decline, was again at 1.57 in 1950—clear evidence
that the ratio over the period had, on the whole, risen. The reason,
of course, lies in the fact that with increased mechanization, the use
of inorganic fertilizers, and so. on, the ratio of payments to other in-
dustries to gross income rose; or, in other words, the ratio of net in-
come originating to gross income declined.
Why should the ratio of the value of buildings and equipment to
net income (output) rise, and its ratio to gross income (output) re-
main constant in agriculture—although these ratios declined in some
other sectors (as public utilities)? The answer is provided in part
by the ratios for other major items of capital in agriculture, particu-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
stock). The ratio of the value of land—improved land—to either gross
or net farm income declined steadily, particularly sharply after 1920.
The reason, of course, lies in the increasing difficulty of expanding the
area of cultivated and improved land on farms. This puts a premium
upon the capacity to increase output without additional land, a ca-
pacity in which the availability of equipment and many types of pro-
ductive buildings is one factor. The ratio of the value of horses and
mules to either gross or net income was fairly steady through 1920 and
then declined sharply, clearly because of increasing substitution of
mechanized equipment for power animals—another factor that tends
to sustain the ratio of net durable capital to gross income or to raise
its ratio to net income. Even for other livestock, there was a continuous
decline in the ratio of the stock to gross or net income, apparent after
1890 and with another conspicuous falling off after 1920. Here also
greater yield may have been possible through the input of products of
other industries or of better capital (special types of chemically bol-
stered feed, new structures for milk cows, mechanical equipment for
milking, and the like). In short, the estimates indirectly reflect the
whole process of the industrialization of agriculture—the basis of the
sustained ratio of net durable capital to gross or net income, cotermi-
nous with substantial declines in the ratios of other types of capital to
gross or net income.
Another aspect of the process is revealed in Table 29. The ten regions
into which the country is divided in the table are characterized by
rather different types of agricultural complexes, and by differences in
the time of entry upon sustained demographic and economic growth.15
Of particular interest in the analysis of long-term trends in capital
formation are two findings here regarding the relation between capi-
tal and output. One is the wide range of difference within one and
the same "industry" (if agriculture can be called that) in the ratio of
capital to income, whatever the variant. Thus in 1869, the ratio of
total capital to gross income ranged from S.45 to 16.87, that of re-
producible capital, from 1.15 to 5.70 (and the range would presuma-
bly have been wider for ratios to net income originating); even by
1949, the range for the reproducible capital-income ratio was from
0.98 (in the Pacific region) to more than double that, 2.11 (in the Lake
states). The second finding is that in the process of growth of various
parts of an industry, or for a large part of the economy (as we observed

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
for the four sectors in Table 27), there is convergence—a reduction in
the variability—in the capital-income (-output) ratios. When the ratios
are initially high, the decline tends to be large or the rise small com-
pared with the change in initially low or moderate ratios. The con-
vergence is expressed statistically in columns 12 and 13 of Table 29.
For the total capital-output ratios, the weighted absolute deviation—a
proper measure of the variability of the ratios among the regions—
drops from 2.96 in 1869 to 1.72 in 1909, and even as a relative of
the mean, declines from 33.8 to 23.5. The average absolute deviation
also declines, from 1.62 in 1909 to 1.17 in 1949, but that decline is
about proportional to the drop in the countrywide mean ratio. A
similar convergence, primarily during the first half of the total period,
occurs in the regional ratios of reproducible capital to output.
Both the wide differences among regions in their capital-output
ratios and the convergence of these differences by 1910 or 1920 were
to be expected. In any major industry the various branches have dif-
ferent relations of capital to output, and as an industry grows the new
areas tend to become more similar to the old, to the point where inte-
gration is completed and more intensive specialization and diversifica-
tion begin. We shall observe the same two findings within each major
sector covered.
Table 30 presents the detail we have for mining and manufacturing
concerning the movement of capital-output ratios for the varying defi-
nitions of numerator and denominator. For mining we have capital
excluding land, and fixed capital, that is, buildings and machinery.
For each, the ratio to gross output moves in a similar pattern, rising
more than threefold from 1870 to 1919 and then declining sharply.
Over the period as a whole, the trend in each ratio is upward. One
can only conjecture whether the results would be the same if net in-
come originating were substituted for gross output in the denominator.
There is no reason for assuming major long-term trends in the ratio
of net to gross output for the branches of mining, but the internal shifts
did probably tend to reduce the ratio of net income to gross output
for total mining. In 1929, the ratio of total payments to individuals
plus corporate savings to gross income in oil and gas was barely over
20 per cent, whereas it was over 65 per cent in anthracite coal and
bituminous coal, and over 55 per cent in metals.16 Since the share of
16SeeKuznets, assisted by Epstein and Jenks, National Income and Its Composi.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CTrends in Structure of Capital Formation
oil and gas in total mining output increased prodigiously—from a few
percentage points in 1870 to over 60 per cent in 1953—the ratio of net
to gross output in mining as a whole must have declined materially.
If so, the capital-net output ratio in mining must have increased more
markedly than the capital-gross output ratios shown in columns 2 and
3 of Table 30.
More information is available on the important sector of manufac-
turing. Both total and fixed capital can be related not only to gross
output, but also to net value added—a closer approximation to net in-
come originating than is gross output. (Net value added excludes the
cost of fuel and raw materials but includes payments to other indus-
tries and capital consumption.) The striking feature of columns 6 to 9
is that the movement of the capital-output ratios over time follows
the same pattern, whether the numerator is total or fixed capital, and
whether the denominator is gross output or net value added. Here,
there was apparently very little substitution of fixed capital (buildings
and machinery) for other items in total capital (as there was in agri-
culture of fixed capital for livestock); and there was not much move-
ment over time in the ratio of net value added to gross value of output.
We find, therefore, that all the ratios rose to a peak in 1919, declined
thereafter, and showed no significant rise or decline over the period
as a whole.
Have the movements in the capital-output ratios observed for total
mining and total manufacturing been the same for the branches that
can be distinguished within these sectors? Table 31 answers this ques-
tion for the five branches of mining for the period 1870—1953. The
movements appear to follow the same pattern in all branches—a rise
to a peak in 1919 and a subsequent decline—with the trend over the
period as a whole being neither significantly up nor down. But there
are some interesting exceptions. In anthracite, the sharp decline in
output after 1919 not only kept the capital.output ratio (capital, ex-
cluding land) from dropping but actually tended to raise it. In metals,
the peak capital-output ratio, whether for total or fixed capital, was
reached in 1890. In oil and gas—an extremely interesting case because
of its high rate of growth—the capital-output ratio, though higher in
1870 than that for any other branch of mining, rose quite rapidly and
by 1919 was more than three times its 1870 level. Then it declined
precipitously and by 1953 was significantly below its 1870 level, par-
ticularly so for fixed capital. But the oil and gas branch only repro-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
others. Apparently increasing mechanization and technological com-
plexity result first in an accumulation of capital, total or fixed, which
means a higher rate of growth than in output; then, with the slowing
down in the growth of the industries and with the technological base
set, capital saving improvements can be introduced and attempts
made to raise the rate of utilization of existing capacity.
Two aspects of the movement within mining deserve note. First, the
relative importance of the oil and gas industry increased rapidly, its
output accounting for less than 10 per cent of the total in 1890 but
for over 60 per cent in 1953. With its capital-output ratio always well
above the ratio for mining as a whole, this rise in relative importance
of the industry contributed to an upward trend in the capital-output
ratio for mining as a whole. The changes in the sector-mix therefore
tended to raise the capital-output ratio throughout the period. Second,
the capital.output ratios in the several branches converged, particularly
between 1919 and 1953. Weighted absolute deviations of the branch
ratios from the ratio for mining as a whole confirm that impression.
For the ratios of total capital to output, these deviations were 0.99 for
1890, 1.57 for 1919 (or 1.53 comparable with the figure for the earlier
year), and 0.21 for 1953. The weighted relative deviations for the
relevant dates—the coefficients of variation—were 0.73, 0.69 (or 0.67
comparable with the figure for 1890), and 0.17, respectively. For the
ratios of fixed capital to output, the absolute deviations were 0.89 for
1890, 1.51 for 1919 (or 1.54 comparable with the figure for the earlier
year), and 0.20 for 1953. The coefficients of variation were 0.75, 0.77,
and 0.24, respectively. The striking decline in the capital-output ratio
for the oil and gas branch between 1919 and 1953, as well as the sharp
drop in the ratio for metals from its peak in 1890—another branch with
a high capital-output ratio—contributed to the greater equality in the
branch ratios in the later periods than in the earlier periods.
For the manufacturing sector many more branches can be distin-
guished than for mining. Only the major industrial branches are shown
in Table 32, but a more detailed analysis can be found in the mono-
graph dealing with this sector. The main purpose of Table 32 is to
reveal the similarity between the pattern of movement of the total
capital-output ratio for manufacturing as a whole and that for the
twelve major branches distinguished. In all branches—with the ex-
ception of rubber and its products, and transportation equipment (both
of which showed a peak in 1900), and printing and publishing (which
showed a peak in 1937)—the peak capital-output ratio was reached
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in 1919. In all of them (except printing and publishing) the movement
in the ratio was downward after 1919. Some of the exceptions are
illuminating: both rubber and its products, and transportation equip-
ment (mainly automobiles) were going through periods of turbulent
growth and mechanization somewhat later than the other branches,
and their peak ratios in 1900 probably indicate that the high rates of
new additions to plant and equipment reflected an expectation of
growth exceeding the needs of current output.
For the other findings suggested by study of the major and minor
branches of manufacturing we turn to the analysis in the relevant
monograph (Creamer, Dobrovoisky, and Borenstein, op. cit.). Three
conclusions merit emphasis here. The first concerns the effect of shifts
in relative importance of various industries within total manufactur-
ing. The finding, noted above, that the major branches display similar
movements in their total capital-output ratios suggests that the shifts
in weight among industries could not contribute greatly to the move-
ment of the sector-wide ratio. And this suggestion is confirmed by direct
calculations, which indicate that of the rise in the total capital-output
ratio from 1880 to 1919, only one-sixth can be attributed to the altered
composition of the manufacturing total. The downward movement
from 1919 to 1937 occurred without any contribution from the chang-
ing industry-mix. The latter, in fact, would have made for a slight
rise, rather than a decline, in the total capital-output ratio.
The second conclusion relates to the increasing convergence among
the industry total capital-output ratios, similar to that observed among
the ten regions in agriculture and the five divisions in mining. The
coefficient of variation in the total capital-output ratios based on values
in 1929 prices, in thirty-seven manufacturing industries, ranged from
63 to 70 per cent (of the mean ratio for manufacturing as a whole)
from 1880 to 1900. It then dropped significantly and fairly consistently
to slightly over 31 per cent in 1948. This means in essence that, in those
industries for which the initial capital-output ratio was high, the de-
cline was greater, or the rise smaller, than in those industries for which
the initial capital-output ratio was low.
The third conclusion is that, while the relative changes in output
and in total capital were positively correlated, the association between
relative changes in output and in the total capital-output ratio was
negative. For fifty or more industries distinguished in this calculation
based on volumes in 1929 prices, the coefficient of correlation between




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































oTrends in Structure of Capital Formation
and +0.68 for changes from 1919 to 1948. In other words, industries in
which output increased more also showed greater proportional rises
in their capital stock. However, the correlation between relative
changes in output and in the capital-output ratio was negative, in the
order of —0.39 for 1880—1919, and —0.37 for 1919—1948 (all coefficients
were statistically significant). In other words, the greater the rise in
output, the less the rise, or the greater the decline, in the total capital-
output ratio.
The last two conclusions are, of course, interrelated. High capital-
output ratios are likely to be found among industries in the early
stages of growth, when extensive expansion is at a high rate and build.
ing is in advance of current needs. It is in these industries that the
relative increase in output is also likely to be at a high rate, and it is
in these industries, all other conditions being equal, that the capital-
output ratio is likely to decline most precipitously. Thus, one and
the same complex of factors—over.expansion in terms of current needs
in "new" industries—would produce, as time goes on, a convergence of
the ratios, that is, a situation in which the initially higher ratios would
decline most or rise least, and the initially lower ratios decline least
or rise most, yielding a negative correlation between the rate of rela-
tive growth in output and the relative change in the capital-output
ratio.
It is in the capital-output ratios in the public utilities sector, a field
that is of great importance in the history of industrialization and capi-
tal formation in this country and many others, that we observe the
most rapid declines (Table 33). The contrast between the ratios for
public utilities and the others discussed so far, particularly those for
manufacturing, is, of course, much exaggerated by differences in the
denominators used. Even net value added in manufacturing is a gross
concept relative to net income originating: in 1929 the latter was less
than 30 per cent of gross value of output, whereas net value added was
well over 40 per cent. The gross income or output of the public utili-
ties sector is, in a way, a far "netter" concept: in 1929, net income
originating in steam railroads (including Pullman and express) ac-
counted for over 70 per cent of gross income; that in electric light and
power and gas, for well over 60 per cent; that in communications (tele-
phone and telegraph), for somewhat over 70 per cent.17 Hence the
1'Kuznets, assisted by Epstein and Jenks, National Income and Its Coin posi-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Trends in Structure of Capital Formation
capital-output ratios in Table 33 are more properly compared with ra-
tios to net income originating, or lacking the latter, ratios to net value
added in manufacturing or to net farm income in agriculture. Yet
even with this adjustment, there is little question that the capital-out-
put ratios in the public utilities sector, particularly in steam railroads
and in electric light and power, have for a long time been far higher
than the comparable ratios—for fixed capital—in manufacturing, min-
ing, and agriculture. It is also evident that these ratios were at very
high levels in the early periods of the growth of these industries; and
that they declined sharply, indicating remarkable progress in the
efficiency of replacement and utilization of durable capital equipment.
The three conclusions concerning manufacturing, agriculture, and
mining apply here, too. We find convergence among the capital-output
ratios for the several components of public utilities—the initially high
ratios move downward at a rate much greater than that of the initially
lower ratios. We find this occurring in each component, and following
a relatively similar pattern. And we find evidence of negative cor-
relation between the relative increase in output and the relative
change in the capital-output ratio, particularly conspicuous in recent
decades when the resurgence of growth in output is accompanied
by a decline in the capital-output ratios to record low levels.
For the public utilities sector there are two additional findings. First,
in several components, where we can observe the early record of the
industry, the initial period shows a rise in the capital-output ratios.
This is observed for electric railways and for electric light and power
in the rise from 1890 to 1900, and more recently for local bus lines. It
may well be that in some industries, in which it is technologically pos-
sible, the very early phases witnessed an attempt to produce with only
a small investment in fixed capital; and only somewhat later a big
durable capital investment program became feasible, which resulted in
a temporary but substantial rise in the capital-output ratio. In a sense,
this parallels the rise in the ratios in agriculture, mining, and manu-
facturing that culminated in the 1920's. Agriculture, however, saw a
long period of increasing mechanization and industrialization, whereas
in the public utilities there were much shorter periods of transition
from a makeshift, semi-experimental scale of operation to the building
up of an elaborate fixed capital network.
The second additional finding is that the capital-output ratios de-
clined at a decreasing rate, not only on an absolute, but even on a
relative, basis. In other words, as time goes on and the efficiency
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in the use of capital increases, it becomes more difficult to reduce the
ratio. This aspect of the long-term movement is clearly observable in
lines 8 to 11 for the major components of the sector and for the sector
as a whole. It is only in the recent decades that we see a break in that
slowing down in the rate of utilization of capital, and it remains to be
seen how transient or persistent the new and sizable reduction in the
capital-output ratios will prove to be.
219